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Forewords
Energy powers human progress, from job generation 
to economic competitiveness, from strengthening 
security to empowering women, energy is the great 
integrator: it cuts across all sectors and lies at the heart 
of all countries’ core interests. I strongly believe that 
now more than ever, the world needs to ensure that the 
benefits of modern energy are available to all and that 
energy is provided as cleanly and efficiently as possible. 
This is a matter of equity, first and foremost, but it is 
also an issue of urgent practical importance.
Developed countries face the combined challenge and 
opportunity of transforming existing energy infrastructure, 
while developing countries have the opportunity to adopt cleaner, more efficient 
technology from the start. These objectives reinforce each other in many instances, and 
achieving them together will power opportunity, maximize socioeconomic development, 
enhance domestic and international security and help reduce climate change impacts.
The transformational scenario pathways developed by the IIASA Energy Program 
within the framework of the Global Energy Assessment (GEA) approach the global 
transition toward sustainable development in an integrated, holistic manner, taking a 
broad view of the four main energy challenges faced by society in the 21st century: 
providing universal access to modern energy for all; avoiding dangerous climate change; 
reducing the impacts of energy on human health and the environment; and enhancing 
energy security. In other words, achieving sustainable energy—energy that is accessible, 
cleaner and more efficient—powers opportunity. Recognising the importance of sustainable 
energy choices, IIASA and UNIDO, with support of the Global Environment Facility (GEF), 
have partnered to develop specific tools, reports and technical analysis to support 
decision makers in addressing the challenges of providing energy services for 
sustainable development throughout the world.
This report uses the GEA as a knowledge platform and aims to inform decision-makers 
on the scaling-up of low carbon energy technologies, achievement of reductions in 
greenhouse gas emissions, and the reduction of energy poverty.
Kandeh Yumkella
Director-General 
UNIDO
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Two decades ago, decision makers from all segments of 
society gathered in Rio de Janeiro for the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development. The world 
has undergone a substantial transformation since that 
time—socially, economically, politically, and in so many 
other dimensions. Along the way, the International Institute 
for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) has played an active 
role in informing the policy process at all levels and in all 
parts of the globe, particularly on issues that are too large 
or complex for any single nation or scientific discipline to 
solve on its own.
In particular, by employing rigorous scientific 
methodologies and a comprehensive framework of systems-level modeling tools, 
researchers from the Energy Program at IIASA have made a unique and lasting 
contribution to the field of global change research. Energy Program scientists have 
for years investigated the various dimensions of socio-economic and technological 
change and sought solutions for the many social ills of the 21st century that relate to 
the energy conundrum. Two of the best examples of IIASA’s work include the future 
development pathways and emission scenarios they designed and analyzed in support 
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) assessments and the 
World Energy Council study.
The rich tradition of the Energy Program continues today with the finalization of the 
Global Energy Assessment (GEA) and the transformational energy pathways that have 
been developed as a part of this multi-year, multi-stakeholder activity, which aims to 
help decision makers throughout the world address the challenges of providing energy 
services for sustainable development. As summarized in this report, the GEA pathways 
go beyond the existing scenario literature by presenting a comprehensive and integrated 
analysis of energy challenges, opportunities and strategies, for developing, industrialized 
and emerging economies. The pathways make clear that, from both a technical and 
economic perspective, it is entirely feasible to simultaneously (1) mitigate the worst 
effects of climate change, (2) provide near universal energy access, (3) enhance the 
security of national and regional energy systems and infrastructures, and (4) improve 
local air quality in most parts of the globe.
Achieving these multiple objectives for energy sustainability is of course contingent upon 
sufficient political and social will, as well as the willingness of decision makers to take 
a more holistic and integrated perspective of the problems we are facing as a society 
Pavel Kabat
Director/Chief Executive Officer 
IIASA
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over the coming decades. Thanks primarily to the support of the United Nations 
Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) and the Global Environment Facility (GEF), 
this study and the interactive policy tools that have sprung from it help to inform 
the evolving dialogue by illuminating some of the complex relationships, synergies and 
trade-offs between the various dimensions of energy transformation and global change. 
Having worked at the interface of science and policy for almost three decades, I am 
personally convinced that this is a critical step in the right direction. For along the path that 
is sustainability, which will soon take us again through Rio and then beyond, there will be 
a myriad of choices and opportunities. This report provides sound guidance to decision 
makers when considering the different directions they could take.
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Preface
This report provides a high-level summary of the transformational scenario 
pathways developed by the IIASA Energy Program within the framework of the 
Global Energy Assessment (GEA). These pathways approach the global transition 
toward sustainable development in an integrated, holistic manner, taking a broad 
view of the four main energy challenges faced by society in the 21st century: 
providing universal access to modern energy for all; avoiding dangerous climate 
change; reducing the impacts of energy on human health and the environment; 
and enhancing energy security. Developing solutions to these challenges is one of 
the chief aims of policy makers, and for this reason this report attempts to synthesize 
a multitude of strategic insights that have resulted from the pathways analysis. 
The overarching objective of the report is to provide guidance on how to facilitate 
the transformation of the energy system to achieve the multiple energy objectives. 
Focus is given to the required pace of the transformation at both the global and 
regional levels, as well as to the types of measures that will be needed to ensure 
a successful transition.
This report is complemented by three interactive, web-based analytical tools, 
which have been developed by the IIASA Energy Program in support of this 
study: (1) the GEA Scenario Database, which documents the full suite of transition 
pathways in great detail, allowing the user to explore the consequences of 
different supply and demand-side technology choices for the feasibility and costs 
of reaching the multiple energy objectives at both the global and regional levels; 
(2) the IIASA ENE-MCA Policy Analysis Tool, which permits the concurrent assessment 
of synergies and trade-offs between the multiple energy objectives at the global scale; 
and (3) the IIASA Energy Access Tool (ENACT), which helps gauge the effectiveness 
of various energy access policies and measures in the major developing regions 
of the world.
vii
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Main Findings of the 
Global Energy Assessment Scenario Analysis
The large ensemble of future energy pathways developed by the IIASA Energy Program within the 
framework of the Global Energy Assessment (the “GEA pathways”) shows that it is possible to achieve 
improved energy access, air quality, and energy security simultaneously, while avoiding dangerous climate 
change. Doing so will require a technological transformation of the global energy system over the next 
several decades, as well as the rapid introduction of policies and fundamental political changes toward 
concerted and coordinated efforts to integrate global concerns into local and national policy priorities. 
An in-depth modeling and sensitivity analysis illustrates the following commonalities of the GEA pathways:
  Constant and sustained energy efficiency improvements are imperative, in order to reduce the 
risk that the multiple energy objectives become unreachable. Lowering the energy intensity of 
the global economy – at improvement rates consistent with the recent past, if not much faster – 
helps to increase the flexibility of supply and the overall cost-effectiveness of the energy system 
transformation.
  Low-carbon shares in global primary energy must reach at least 60–80% by 2050. This will necessitate a 
broad portfolio of supply-side options, including non-combustible renewables, bioenergy, nuclear energy, 
and carbon capture and storage (CCS). In particular, this translates to:
  Strong growth in renewable energy beginning immediately and reaching 165–650 exajoules (EJ) 
of primary energy by 2050.
  An increasing requirement for storage technologies to support system integration of intermittent 
wind and solar energy.
  Growth in bioenergy in the medium term to 80–140 EJ by 2050 (including extensive use 
of agricultural residues and second-generation bioenergy to mitigate adverse impacts on 
land use and food production).
  Nuclear energy playing an important role in the supply-side portfolio in some, but not all, 
transition pathways. (The assessment of “restricted” portfolio pathways suggests that it is 
also feasible to phase out nuclear and still meet the sustainability targets.)
  Fossil CCS as an optional bridging or transitional technology in the medium term, and increasing 
contribution of biomass with CCS in the long.
  Aggressive decarbonization is particularly critical in the electricity sector, where low-carbon 
shares will likely need to reach between 75 and almost 100% by 2050. This means a phase-out of 
conventional coal power (i.e., without CCS) in the short to medium term, with natural gas power 
potentially acting as a bridging or transitional technology.
  Transportation sector enhancements, through electrification or the introduction of hydrogen vehicles, 
can improve end-use efficiency and increase supply flexibility.
  Oil consumption will likely need to peak in the transportation sector by 2030, followed by a phase-out 
over the medium term. Strong growth of liquid biofuels will be necessary to offset petroleum-based fuels 
in the short to medium term, after which the mix of liquid and gaseous fuels depends on transportation 
system choices and technological breakthroughs.
  The availability of energy resources should not limit low-carbon technology deployment on an 
aggregated global scale but may pose important constraints regionally, particularly in Asia, 
where energy demand is expected to grow rapidly.
  The transformation of the global energy system would require substantially increased future cash flows:
  Dedicated efforts to increase global energy-related investments to between US$1.7 trillion and 
US$2.2 trillion annually, compared with about US$1.3 trillion in annual investment today. 
Commonalities of 
the GEA Pathways
viii
  Out of this total, about US$300 to US$550 billion per year would be for efficiency-related 
investments on the demand-side.
  Future transitions with a focus on energy efficiency would achieve the targets at more 
modest cost and, thus, represent the lower bound of the investment range.
  Total energy investments correspond to a small fraction (about 2%) of global 
gross domestic product (GDP).
The storylines of the required energy system transformations that are quantified and elaborated in the 
GEA pathways are far richer than these commonalities suggest. Nevertheless, this collation of all the 
required features of an energy system transformation describes the trunk off which the many choices and 
possibilities branch. Many of these choices are strongly influenced by one or more of the GEA objectives 
with respect to energy access, air pollution, climate change, and energy security. Table 1 summarizes 
some of the main characteristics of the pathways in the context of each objective and the more detailed 
policy and investment requirements that illustrate how these pathways might be driven.
Meeting the sustainability objectives will require further tightening of present and 
planned legislation and the introduction of new policies:
  Universal access to electricity and clean cooking requires the rapid shift from the use of traditional 
biomass to cleaner fuels and technologies. This is feasible over the next 20 years provided that sufficient 
financial resources are made available for investments on the order of US$36 billion to US$41 billion/year 
(half of it in Africa). Universal access results in significant health benefits of more than 24 million 
disability-adjusted life years (DALYs) saved in 2030.
  Pollution control measures across all sectors need to be tightened beyond those in present and planned 
legislation in order to meet World Health Organization (WHO) air quality standards. Estimated global 
costs to meet the air pollution target are about US$200 billion to US$350 billion annually to 2030 
(about 10–20% of energy costs), resulting in about 21 million DALYs saved in 2030. 
  Limiting global temperature change to less than 2°C over preindustrial levels can only be achieved through 
stringent climate policies motivating rapid reductions of global CO2 emissions from the energy sector, 
which in the GEA pathways peak around 2020 and decline thereafter to 30–70% below 2000 emissions 
levels in 2050, eventually reaching zero or even negative CO2 emissions in the second half of the century. 
  Enhanced energy security for regions can be achieved by both limiting dependence on imported 
fuels and increasing the diversity and resilience of energy systems. A focus on energy efficiency 
improvement and renewable deployment increases the share of domestic (national or regional) 
supply in primary energy by a factor of 2 and thus significantly decreases import dependency.
The GEA pathways illustrate the importance of a holistic and integrated approach to 
energy policy and planning:
  The simultaneous achievement of energy access, climate change mitigation, energy security, 
and air pollution control comes at a significantly reduced total energy cost when the multiple 
economic benefits of each are properly accounted for. 
  Above all, stringent climate policy and a rapid decarbonization of the energy system will 
allow these enormous synergies to be realized.
  The added costs of air pollution control can be cut by up to US$500 billion annually to 2030 
at the global level.
  The costs of pursuing energy security interests can be reduced to almost zero, translating to an 
annual cost savings of about US$130 billion in 2030.
Fossil fuel subsidies, particularly to the most affluent parts of the global population, can be lowered by 
about US$70 billion to US$130 billion per year by 2050. (At present, subsidies of coal and oil products 
amount to about US$132 billion to US$240 billion per year.)
Policies to Drive 
the Sustainable 
Energy Transition
Maximizing 
Synergies
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The Objectives: 
Progress along Multiple Dimensions
Reaching the economic, environmental and social sustainability objectives of all 
societies requires that several major energy challenges be successfully overcome and 
necessitates rapid progress along multiple dimensions. The energy pathways presented 
in this book describe transformative changes toward these goals. The pathways were 
developed by the IIASA Energy Program within the framework of the Global Energy 
Assessment (GEA) to explore technical measures, policies, and related costs and 
benefits for meeting the following energy objectives:
  providing almost universal access to affordable clean cooking fuel and electricity 
for the poor, 
  limiting air pollution and health damages from energy use, 
  improving energy security throughout the world, and 
  avoiding dangerous climate change.
These objectives are defined as quantitative targets in the GEA pathways, 
i.e., a schedule is specified for meeting each target by a certain point in time 
(Table 1). The targets are of central importance, since they define the ambitiousness 
and the magnitude and pace of the required energy system transformation. 
They act as the major drivers of the pathways, defining the policy stringency and 
portfolio of measures that are necessary to simultaneously respond to the multiple 
energy challenges. Because the GEA objectives are strongly normative, the targets 
are all designed to be ambitious. The GEA pathways nevertheless make clear that 
all the targets can be reached, if appropriate policies are introduced and energy 
investments are scaled up considerably.
Energy
Access
Energy
Security
Climate
Change
Energy for
Sustainable
Development
Air Pollution
and Health
Figure 1 
Sustainable development 
means solving the four 
main energy challenges
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Table 1 Targets for the four main energy challenges, key characteristics of the corresponding transition pathways, and illustrative 
examples of policies and investments.
Objective Target and timeline Pathway characteristics Examples of policies and investments
Improve energy 
access
Universal access to 
electricity and clean 
cooking by 2030
Diffusion of clean and efficient 
cooking appliances
Extension of both high-voltage 
electricity grids and decentralized 
microgrids
Increased financial assistance from 
industrialized countries to support 
clean energy infrastructure
Microcredits and grants for low-emission 
biomass and LPG stoves in combination with 
LPG and kerosene fuel subsidies for low-income 
populations
Estimated cost to provide clean cooking: US$17 
billion to US$22 billion per year to 2030 
Grants for high-voltage grid extensions and 
decentralized microgrids
Estimated cost to provide rural grid connections: 
US$18.4 billion to US$19 billion per year to 2030
Reduce air 
pollution and 
improve human 
health
Achieve global 
compliance with WHO 
air quality standards 
(PM2.5 concentration 
< 35 µg/m3) by 2030
Tightening of technology standards 
across transportation and 
industrial sectors (e.g., vehicles, 
shipping, power generation, 
industrial processes)
Combined emissions pricing and 
quantity caps (with trading)
Fuel switching from traditional 
biomass to modern energy forms 
for cooking in developing countries
Vehicles: Euro 3–4 standards for 
vehicles in developing countries by 2030 
(e.g., –60% NOx, PM reductions by 2030)
Shipping: Revised MARPOL Annex 
VI and NOx Technical Code 2008 
(–80% SOx, NOx reductions by 2030)
Industry/power: rapid desulfurization, de-NOx, 
and PM control around the world by 2030
Estimated cost to meet air pollution targets: 
US$200 billion to US$350 billion/year in 2030 
(about 12% of energy costs); co-benefits of 
stringent climate mitigation policies reduce 
overall pollution control costs by about 50–65%
Avoid dangerous 
climate change
Limit global average 
temperature change to 
2°C above preindustrial 
levels with a likelihood 
>50%
Widespread diffusion of zero- 
and low-carbon energy supply 
technologies, with substantial 
reductions in energy intensity
Energy-related CO2 emissions 
peak by 2020 and are reduced to 
30–70% by 2050 from 2000 levels
Globally comprehensive mitigation 
efforts covering all major emitters
Financial transfers from 
industrialized countries to support 
decarbonization
Combination of cap-and-trade and carbon 
taxes (with initial carbon price >US$30/tCO2, 
increasing over time)
Upscaling of investments into low-carbon 
technologies and efficiency measures to 
>$US600 billion/year to 2050
Additional financial transfers to developing 
countries of about 3–12% of total energy 
systems costs to 2050, depending on the 
domestic commitment of industrialized countries
Enhance energy 
security
Reduce energy import 
dependence; increase 
diversity and resilience 
of energy supply 
(both by 2050)
Increase in local energy supply 
options (e.g., renewables to provide 
30–75% of primary energy by 2050)
Greater diversity of imported fuels 
and reduction in dependency 
(e.g., reduce share of oil imports 
in primary energy by 30–80% by 
2050 from 2000 level)
Infrastructure expansion 
and upgrades to support 
interconnections and backup, 
including increased capacity 
reserves, stockpiles, and energy 
storage technologies
Public procurement strategies and 
regulations to support local supplies 
(e.g., renewable obligations)
Interconnection and back-up agreements 
between energy network operators
Stockpiling of critical energy resources for 
coordinated release during acute market 
shortages
Estimated cost of infrastructure upgrades for 
the electricity grid: >US$310 billion/year by 
2050, co-benefits of stringent climate mitigation 
policies reduce overall security costs (import 
dependency and diversity) by more than 75%.
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The Pathways: 
Taking a Holistic Approach to Energy
The GEA pathways are designed to describe transformative changes toward a more 
sustainable future. A specific feature of these pathways is that they simultaneously 
achieve normative targets related to all four major energy challenges. Emphasis is 
given to the identification of potential synergies, or in other words, of integrated 
solutions and “win–win” strategies in addressing multiple energy objectives 
at the same time. The primary reasons for developing the transformational 
pathways are, first, to provide a quantitative and qualitative framework for the 
identification of policies and measures for a transition toward an energy system 
that supports sustainable development, and second, to facilitate integration of 
diverse energy issues and consistency across the different chapters of the GEA.
One possible way of understanding the GEA pathways is to regard them 
as alternative interpretations of one overarching GEA scenario, in which 
the energy system is transformed under normative, sustainable goals. The 
pathways highlight different degrees of freedom and routes to these goals. 
All economic and demographic changes are the same across the pathways, 
however. They share a common median demographic projection whereby 
the global population increases from almost 7 billion today to about 9 billion 
by the 2050s before declining toward the end of the century (UN, 2009). 
They also possess a common median economic development path, expressed 
in terms of world gross domestic product (GDP), that allows for significant 
development in the 50 or so poorest countries in the world (Riahi et al., 
2012). Global real per capita income in the GEA pathways grows at an annual 
average rate of 2% over the next 50 years. This socioeconomic development 
pathway is chosen to be consistent with global aspirations toward a 
sustainable future.
Although some combination of both supply- and demand-side measures is 
needed to transform the energy system, emphasis on one side or the other 
constitutes an important point of divergence between different policy choices 
that may drive the energy system in alternative directions. Thus, a critical factor is to 
what extent demand-side efficiency measures together with lifestyle and behavioral 
changes, can reduce the amount of energy used for mobility, housing, and industrial 
services, thereby helping to fulfill the GEA’s aspirational goals across virtually the 
whole range of sustainability objectives. If energy demand is low, any of a number of 
alternative supply-side configurations might be able to fulfill the goals. By contrast, 
a lower emphasis on reducing energy demand will require a much more rapid expansion 
There is only one GEA 
scenario – an overarching 
storyline of energy system 
transformation to meet the 
normative sustainability 
targets. The GEA pathways 
– GEA-Efficiency, GEA-Mix, 
GEA-Supply – represent 
alternative descriptions 
of demand- and supply-side 
energy system transformations 
under this umbrella.
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of a broader portfolio of supply-side options. Hence, the successful implementation 
of demand-side policies increases the flexibility of supply-side options, and, vice versa, 
more rapid transformation of the supply side increases flexibility on the demand side.
Three GEA pathway groups are distinguished within the sustainable GEA scenario to 
represent different emphases in terms of demand-side and supply-side changes. Each 
group varies, in particular, with respect to assumptions about the comprehensiveness 
of demand-side policies to enhance efficiency, leading to pathways of comparatively 
low energy demand (GEA-Efficiency), intermediate demand (GEA-Mix), and high 
demand (GEA-Supply). The GEA-Efficiency pathways show the most flexibility on 
the supply side of the energy system, while GEA-Supply is more flexible on the 
demand side, requiring much less pervasive introduction of efficiency measures to 
reduce energy demand for services. The pathways thus explore not only alternative 
combinations of supply- and demand-side policy portfolios, but also different choices 
with respect to overall strategy and level of implementation. In this context, the 
GEA-Mix pathways explore the degrees of freedom offered by more diverse energy 
systems, from resource extraction to services delivered to end users. The emphasis 
of GEA-Mix is on the diversity of the energy supply mix, to enhance the system’s 
resilience against innovation failures or technology shocks. This emphasis also implies 
that the GEA-Mix group of pathways is not necessarily intermediate between the 
other two groups in terms of other salient scenario characteristics (e.g., the required 
policy portfolio, costs, fuel choices, or deployment of individual technologies).
Within each larger group of pathways, a range of alternative pathways for the 
supply-side transformation is explored. Moving to a specific pathway entails critical 
choices, or “branching points.” The first branching point tests the flexibility of 
different supply-side configurations to fulfill the GEA sustainability objectives, given 
the levels of energy demand in the pathway group. One aim was specifically to use 
the GEA Integrated Assessment Models (see Box 1) to explore whether any of the 
The GEA scenario and pathways were developed in parallel by two integrated assessment 
modeling frameworks and through an iterative and participatory process so as to achieve 
integration across various chapters of the GEA (Figure 3). Important inputs to the GEA 
scenarios include quantitative techno-economic information, such as technology costs, energy 
resources, and potentials, which were provided by other GEA clusters. In addition, a series of 
workshops and a scenario questionnaire were prepared by the GEA writing team and external 
experts to solicit input for defining the main characteristics of the GEA scenario taxonomy 
and the set of objectives for a sustainable energy system with specific targets and timelines. 
These inputs are used by two modeling frameworks for the development of the GEA pathways: 
MESSAGE (Messner and Strubegger, 1995; Riahi et al., 2007) and IMAGE (Bouwman et al., 2006).
box 1 The GEA Scenario Development Process
4
Figure 2
Schematic illustration of the GEA pathways and the three branching points. The scenario setup features 
alternative choices for the combination of demand-side efficiency improvements and supply-side 
transformations, describing alternative policy emphases that would enable the transformation toward a 
sustainable energy system. The pie charts represent primary energy portfolios of feasible transformation 
pathways under different branching point assumptions
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supply options were mandatory. To do this, constraints were set on the portfolio of 
supply-side options by prohibiting or limiting the availability of specific technologies, 
including nuclear, CCS, biomass, and other renewables. Another branching point, 
whose importance was revealed by this supply-side analysis, concerns changes in the 
transportation system. A “conventional” transportation system relying on liquid fuels 
(oil, biofuels, liquefied natural gas) has substantively different implications for supply 
flexibility than an “advanced” system dominated by electric or hydrogen-powered 
vehicles. The former represents the least discontinuity from current trends, in 
terms of both end-use technologies and fuel supply and distribution infrastructure, 
whereas the latter involves a more fundamental transformation, requiring largely 
new infrastructure systems in the case of hydrogen fuel cell vehicles, or new uses for 
existing infrastructure in the case of plug-in hybrids or fully electric vehicles. Although 
any major transformation in an end-use sector that entails fuel switching will impact 
the energy supply, the magnitude of the impact of such a transformation in the 
transportation system alone warranted its inclusion as an explicit branching point. 
The various branching points lead to a total of 20 alternate pathways within each 
pathway group, giving a total of 60 alternative GEA pathways (Table 2, Figure 2). 
Of these, 19 were rejected as they failed to fulfill the GEA objectives: that is, 
no feasible solution could be found within these pathways that would meet the 
normative GEA targets summarized in Table 1.
Table 2 GEA pathways and branching points.
Branching point 1: 
What is the level of 
energy demand?
Branching point 2:
What are the dominant transportation 
fuels and technologies?
Branching point 3:
How diverse is the portfolio of 
supply-side options?
GEA-Efficiency (low demand)
GEA-Supply (high demand)
GEA-Mix (intermediate demand)
Conventional (liquid fuels)
Advanced (electricity, hydrogen)
Full portfolio (all options)
Restricted portfolio 
(excludes or limits particular options):
  No CCS
  No BioCCS
  No sinks
  No nuclear
  No nuclear and no CCS
  Limited renewables
  Limited biomass
  Limited biomass and renewables
  Limited biomass, no BioCCS, no sinks
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Key Features of the Energy Transition
Although simultaneous fulfillment of the GEA objectives poses an extremely ambitious task, the GEA 
scenario analysis shows it is technically possible. The full suite of GEA pathways, grouped according 
to the aggressiveness with which energy demand can be reduced, highlights the potential role for 
a range of energy conversion chains from primary energy sources to conversion technologies and 
on to end-use technologies. Although there are a number of choices available to direct the energy 
system transformation, there are also a large number of givens – nonnegotiable, nondiscretionary 
components of an energy transition that must begin in 2010. These commonalities across all pathways 
are summarized here:
  Improvements to at least the historical rate of energy intensity reduction (more rapid improvements 
in energy intensity, and thus aggressive efforts to improve end-use efficiency, would increase the 
flexibility of supply as well as the overall cost-effectiveness of the energy system transformation)
  A rapid shift from traditional biomass to widely accessible, clean, flexible energy forms
  Important regional constraints on availability of energy resources, although such constraints do not limit 
deployment on an aggregated global scale
  A broad portfolio of supply-side options, focusing on low-carbon energy from renewables, bioenergy, 
nuclear, and CCS
  Strong growth in renewable energy beginning immediately; a rising requirement for storage 
technologies to support the integration of intermittent wind and solar power into electrical grids
  Strong bioenergy growth in the medium term, with extensive use of agricultural residues and, in the 
medium term, nonagricultural feedstocks (second-generation bioenergy), to mitigate adverse impacts 
on land use and food production
  Nuclear energy as an important part of the supply-side portfolio in many transition pathways, 
although it is also feasible to phase out nuclear completely
  CCS as an optional bridging or transitional technology in the medium term – unless energy demand is 
high, in which case CCS becomes necessary
  Aggressive decarbonization in the electricity sector (especially in the high-demand case); a rapid 
phase-out of conventional coal power (i.e., without CCS); natural gas power as a bridging or transitional 
technology in the short to medium term
  At least some electrification of the transportation sector, even in a conventional liquid fuels–based system
  Continued dominance of oil among liquid and gaseous fuels into and beyond the medium term; strong 
growth in liquid biofuels in the medium term; thereafter the mix of liquid and gaseous fuels depends on 
transportation system choices and technological breakthroughs
  Substantial increases in investment on both the demand and the supply side (including energy 
infrastructure)
  Concerted and aggressive policies to support energy system transformation, including strong regulation 
and standards and externality pricing
The GEA transition pathways show that simultaneously achieving the multiple objectives for energy 
sustainability – along the dimensions of climate change, energy access, energy security, and air 
pollution and health – will require a scaling up of global energy investments: 
  Investment levels must increase by almost a factor of 2 compared with today, corresponding to annual 
investments of between US$1.7 trillion and US$2.2 trillion, or about 1.8–2.3% of global GDP. 
  On the energy supply-side, the transformation of the system is achieved through pronounced shifts 
of investment away from the upstream fossil fuel sector to downstream electricity generation and 
Summary of 
Findings
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transmission. Consequently, the share of upstream fossil fuel–related supply-side investment in total 
investment decreases from 30% at present to about 12–23% by 2050. At the same time, electricity 
investment increases its share on average from about 42% to up to 68% by 2050.
  Among all supply-side options, the largest increase in investment needs is for renewable power 
generation, ranging from US$160 billion/year to US$800 billion/year in 2050 (compared with US$160 
billion/year in 2010). 
  Global average electricity grid investment (including storage to allow the integration of intermittent 
renewables) by 2050 increases to between US$310 billion and US$500 billion/year, compared with 
US$260 billion in 2010. 
  Investment in CCS ranges from zero to about US$65 billion/year in 2050, and investment in nuclear is 
between US$5 billion and US$210 billion/year. 
  Energy investments vary quite dramatically by region across the GEA pathways. Notably, with their 
rapidly growing economies and populations, the investment needs in the developing world will be much 
larger than in currently industrialized countries over the course of this century.
 An interactive Web-based database tool allowing users to view, analyze, and export all output from the full suite of GEA 
transition pathways
URL: www.iiasa.ac.at/web-apps/ene/geadb 
Detailed scenario data for the individual GEA pathways are publicly available in the GEA database. This data includes socio-economic 
indicators; resource, fuel, and technology utilization profiles, emissions trajectories and concentration pathways, prices of resources 
and fuels, and various other types of information. The GEA database provides interactive features for data visualization and a user 
interface for the download of scenario information in different formats.
box 2 The GEA Scenario Database
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Energy Demand and Energy Efficiency
The adequate provision of energy services is a prerequisite for human well-being and 
productivity, and ultimately it is the demand for these services that drives the energy 
system and its continuing expansion. Increasing affluence has historically been 
one of the major drivers of energy demand, and both the quantity and the quality 
of energy services determine in turn the magnitude of environmental and social 
impacts associated with the energy system. A subset of these impacts are addressed 
by the normative objectives enshrined in the overarching GEA scenario.
Energy services are typically provided by end-use technologies, which convert energy 
from a particular form (biomass, petroleum, natural gas, electricity, and so forth) 
into services useful to a final consumer (heating and cooking, mobility, industrial 
processing, entertainment, and others). Consequently, end-use technologies and 
the efficiency with which they convert energy into useful services are inseparably 
connected with the levels and types of energy services demand. As a result, 
one can identify three broad and interrelated approaches to tackling 
demand-side challenges in the energy system:
  Improve technological efficiency – e.g., increase vehicle fuel efficiency
  Change the structure of energy services demand – e.g., substitute physical 
mobility with “virtual” mobility enabled by electronic communications
  Reduce the level of energy services demand – e.g., reduce travel needs 
by living closer to work or amenities.
Although all three of these approaches are explored in the GEA pathways 
as means of reducing final demand for energy, the emphasis here is on 
efficiency improvements. Through its potential to decouple energy demand from 
economic growth, energy efficiency represents a central lever for policy to target. 
Moreover, efficiency contributes to all the sustainability objectives. The degree to 
which efficiency improvements can limit energy demand growth is – by design – 
one of the main distinguishing characteristics of the GEA pathways. 
Energy intensity metrics are widely used to represent the overall energy productivity 
of an economy or sector. Energy intensity is defined as energy used per unit of 
output and is typically expressed in megajoules per US dollar (MJ/US$) of GDP or 
value added. The final energy intensity of the global economy has fallen historically 
at a rate of about 1.2%/year since the early 1970s. However, some regions have 
over certain periods experienced substantially more rapid reductions. For example, 
China’s energy intensity declined at a rate of about 4%/year between 1990 and 
2000 (followed by a slower decline in the subsequent period). Despite the energy 
Reducing wasteful energy 
use in buildings, transport 
and industry is the single 
most important strategy 
for achieving energy 
sustainability, especially in 
the near to medium term.
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efficiency and intensity improvements that have already been implemented to 
date, energy intensity improvements can continue for a long time to come, as the 
efficiency of the energy system remains far from the theoretical potential. Although 
the full realization of this potential may never be possible, many estimates indicate 
that energy intensity reductions of a factor of 10 or more may be possible in the 
very long run (Nakicenovic et al., 1993; Gilli et al., 1995; Nakicenovic et al., 1996). 
The degree of energy intensity improvement is a crucial uncertainty for the future. 
All three groups of GEA pathways depict energy intensity futures that are driven by 
policies to improve energy efficiency, leading to global energy intensity improvement 
rates at or above historical experience. This is partly a result of increasing importance 
of some low income regions with relatively high rates of intensity improvement – but 
also of the assumed move away from inefficient traditional fuels in the developing 
world. Energy intensity improvements, thus, vary significantly at the regional level, 
with some regions developing also slower than the historical rate, particularly in the 
GEA-Supply and Mix pathways. The resulting global average reduction in energy 
intensity varies across the GEA pathways between about 1.5% and 2.2% annually 
to 2050. The lower end of the range is slightly faster than the historical experience, 
whereas the higher end is roughly double that and corresponds to a reduction in 
energy intensity of 60% by 2050. Cumulatively, these intensity improvements lead 
to substantial differences in per capita energy demand across the three pathway 
groups (see Figure 4).
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Figure 4
Historical and projected energy intensity (left panel) and per capita final 
energy use (right panel) in the developing and industrialized worlds. Solid 
lines denote the illustrative GEA pathways within each of the three pathway 
groups; dashed lines show changes in energy intensity due to supply-side 
variations. The inset in the left panel shows rates of improvement in energy 
intensity (calculated using GDP at market exchange rates) between 2005 
and 2050 and between 2005 and 2100. Source of historical data: IEA (2010).
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Studies have shown that it is possible to improve energy intensity radically through a 
combination of behavioral changes and the rapid introduction of stringent efficiency 
regulations, technology standards, and environmental externality pricing (in order to 
mitigate “rebound effects”1). The group of GEA-Efficiency pathways depicts such a 
development with a radical departure from historical trends. The overarching finding 
of the Global Energy Assessment is that the rapid energy intensity improvements 
depicted by the GEA-Efficiency group of pathways are feasible with currently available 
technologies. The necessary magnitude and pace of change, however, will require a 
fundamental shift in the way energy is used across all major sectors of the economy 
and will undoubtedly necessitate concerted and dedicated demand-side policies and 
measures (see Table 3). Because the GEA-Efficiency group of pathways deliberately 
explores the consequences of demand-side interventions, it leads to substantial 
declines in per capita energy use in the industrialized world (Figure 4). Yet, given 
expected economic growth in the developing world, per capita energy demand 
continues to increase in these regions over the course of the century, although 
at a considerably slower pace than in the other GEA pathways groups.
If the GEA-Efficiency pathways group depicts the upper bound of potential 
efficiency improvements and the lower bound of energy demand in the GEA 
pathways, then the GEA-Supply pathways group depicts the opposite, that is, 
the lower bound of potential efficiency improvements, thereby giving rise to an 
upper bound of energy demand across all GEA pathways. The GEA-Supply pathways 
place much less emphasis on efficiency and other demand-side measures, focusing 
instead on supply-side transformations. In the GEA-Supply pathways, the long-term 
improvement rate in global energy intensity over the course of the century is slightly 
above the historical record. As a result, per capita energy use in the industrialized world 
stays at roughly 2005 levels, while per capita demand in the developing world catches 
up to the former, increasing by almost a factor of two in the long term (Figure 4). 
The GEA-Mix pathways group is characterized by intermediate efficiency 
improvements, giving rise to energy intensities, both economy-wide and per capita 
that lie between the aggressive GEA-Efficiency pathways and the less prescriptive 
demand-side trends of the GEA-Supply pathways (Figure 4).
Table 3 summarizes the various sectoral measures to improve end-use efficiency that 
drive the GEA pathways, particularly the GEA-Efficiency group. The GEA-Efficiency 
1 Rebound effects describe an increase in demand for energy services as improvements in efficiency 
lower their effective cost. These effects can be direct (the savings from greater efficiency are spent on 
the same energy service), indirect (the savings are spent on a different energy service), or economy-wide 
(the savings contribute to economic and income growth, which increases demand). Rebound effects 
can be mitigated by price and other policies.
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pathways assume successful, rapid and widespread implementation of efficiency 
and demand management policies and measures over the next several decades, 
substantially reducing final energy demands below levels that would be expected in 
an “efficiency-as-usual” baseline scenario (Figure 5). The GEA-Mix and GEA-Supply 
groups are a bit less optimistic in this regard.
Table 3 Sectoral measures to improve end-use efficiency in the GEA pathways.
Buildings 
(Residential & Commercial) Transportation Industry
  Potential efficiency gains for 
thermal demands in buildings 
are among the highest across 
all end-use sectors; however, 
electricity consumption for 
appliances is expected to 
increase.
  Achieving these gains requires 
the rapid introduction of 
strict building codes and 
retrofit standards for almost 
the complete global building 
stock over the period to 2050. 
The rate of retrofit would 
need to increase to about 3% 
annually, about three times the 
historical rate.
  In the GEA-Efficiency group of 
pathways, policies to improve 
thermal insulation as well as 
retrofits to advanced building 
types (passive house standards 
or lower) lead to improvements 
in energy use per unit of floor 
area by a factor of 4 in the 
industrialized world, from 
about 400–900 MJ/m2 down 
to 100–230 MJ/m2 by 2050. 
Improvement rates in the 
developing world are a factor 
of 2 to 3.
  Demand for energy from 
centralized sources and grids is 
further reduced by the adoption 
of technologies that enable 
space heating and cooling with 
net zero use of centralized 
energy. These include solar 
water heating, solar heating, 
air-source or ground-source 
heat pumps powered by 
solar photovoltaics, and 
biomass-based heating.
  In the GEA-Efficiency pathways 
group, about half of the overall 
improvement in transport energy 
intensity by 2050 comes about 
through technical efficiency 
improvements across all modes 
of passenger transportation. 
The compound global effect of 
these efficiency gains reduces 
fuel consumption from about 
1.7 MJ/km in 2005 to 1.3 MJ/km 
by 2050. Gains are largest for road 
vehicles, with some significant 
differences across world regions 
(the range is from 1.9 to 0.9 MJ/km). 
  The other half of the overall 
intensity improvement is achieved by 
reducing demand for mobility as an 
energy service (e.g., by substituting 
travel with teleconferencing) and 
shifting demand for mobility to 
public transportation (e.g., trains 
and buses). Despite these actions, 
transport demand continues to grow 
in absolute terms.
  Increasing affluence leads to a 
5-fold growth in car ownership 
in the developing world, even 
in the GEA-Efficiency pathways 
(from 2 to 11 cars per 100 people 
by 2050). The expected growth 
in the absence of any policies to 
support public transportation and 
limit car ownership would be some 
30% higher still.
  In freight transport, there is a 
pronounced switch toward higher 
shares of railway transportation 
combined with improvement in the 
overall efficiency by about a factor 
of 2 by 2050, from 1.3 MJ/t-km 
(tonne-kilometers) on average in 
2005 down to 0.7 MJ/t-km in 2050.
  Widespread adoption of best available technology 
for new investments (15% improvement).
  Retrofit of existing plants to improve energy 
efficiency, e.g., use of combined heat and power, 
pumps, fans, compressed air and steam systems, 
and so on (15% improvement).
  Optimization of energy and material flows through 
systems design, quality improvements, lifecycle 
product design, and enhanced recycling.
  Further electrification and a switch to 25% renewable 
energy throughout the manufacturing industry 
(10% improvement, though balanced by a similar 
efficiency loss from widespread adoption of CCS).
  In the GEA-Efficiency pathways, energy efficiency in 
the industrial sector improves by about 1.5%/year, 
resulting in overall demand of about 200 EJ in 
2050, around 20% below what it would be in the 
absence of a concerted approach to demand-side 
transformation. This equates to a 50% reduction in 
the overall energy intensity of industrial production.
  Iron and Steel Making: new smelting reduction 
processes; wider application of gas-based direct 
reduced iron; electricity and hydrogen as process 
fuels in the long term.
  Chemical and Petrochemical Products: new 
technologies such as membrane processes, new 
catalytic conversion routes, new olefin production 
processes (e.g., based on ethanol feedstock) 
and process intensification.
  Cement Making: increase the share of alternative 
cementing materials including Bainite cement, 
volcanic ash, geopolymers, and limestone additives.
  Pulp and Paper Making: Process re-design for 
lignin removal in chemical pulping plants; more 
efficient use of black liquor residues, perhaps 
through gasification, and new drying technologies 
for paper making; structural shifts from paper to 
electronic media.
  Aluminum Making: adoption of wetted drained 
cathodes and inert anodes to eliminate carbon 
anode technology; potential for a further increase 
in aluminum recycling rates is rather limited.
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Energy Supply Portfolios
While there is undoubtedly a large portfolio of supply-side options (different forms 
of energy and their attendant conversion technologies) available to meet the 
growing energy demands of the 21st century, a wide range of factors will ultimately 
shape and constrain their individual potentials. The clearest determining factors 
relate to cost, efficiency, resource availability, and other performance attributes. 
In the GEA pathways, still other factors come into play, given the ambitiousness 
of the sustainability objectives and the energy transition required to reach the 
associated targets (see Table 1). For instance, energy access objectives constrain 
the use of traditional fuels in developing countries; energy security objectives 
limit the amount of energy trade and foster increasing diversity of energy supply; 
climate change objectives constrain the use of carbon-intensive energy forms; and 
health objectives ensure low emissions of harmful air pollution. In addition to these 
technological and sustainability criteria are other factors that influence are sure to 
influence the projected success of the various supply-side options. For example, 
some options require advanced technological knowledge, which is not universally 
available. Other options face barriers to a rapid scaling up (Wilson, 2009), such as 
integrating high proportions (e.g., 20% or more) of intermittent energy sources 
(particularly wind and solar) in electricity grids. Still other options face issues of public 
acceptance. Nuclear energy in some countries is an obvious example, but a few forms 
of renewable energy, such as large-scale hydropower, bioenergy, on-shore wind and 
CCS, offer others. Nuclear also entails other societal risks related to accidents or the 
proliferation of weapons-grade fissile material. Finally, the requirements of some 
supply-side options in terms of new physical infrastructure and distribution systems 
are highly capital intensive but face initially low overall demand, and thus are often 
unattractive to both private investors and resource-limited public investors.
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Figure 5
Final energy demand growth in an 
“efficiency-as-usual” scenario and potential 
reductions in 2050 realized through full 
implementation of the various sectoral 
measures to improve end-use efficiency. 
Note: The baseline scenario already 
assumes replacement of inefficient, 
traditional biomass with modern 
cooking fuels.
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In light of all these potential issues, the approach taken in the Global Energy Assessment 
is to elaborate the broadest possible decision space, or range of possibilities, in terms 
of supply-side portfolios in each of the three GEA pathway groups (GEA-Efficiency, 
GEA-Mix, and GEA-Supply). First, the full range of supply-side options is considered, 
subject to cost, performance, and system integration constraints but always respecting 
the overarching need to comply with the GEA targets. As noted earlier, the level of 
demand has a significant impact on supply-side flexibility, with the greater efficiency 
improvements and reductions in energy services demand of the GEA-Efficiency group 
of pathways leaving more options open on the supply side. Next, this maximal decision 
space is reduced in stepwise fashion. The impacts of major changes in the transportation 
system on this unrestricted supply portfolio are explored, and finally the impacts of 
specific restrictions or omissions of particular supply-side options are considered, 
in order to reflect the sensitivities or concerns surrounding their widespread deployment. 
These restricted supply portfolios as well as the transportation analysis provide a broad 
sensitivity analysis around the unrestricted supply portfolio, illustrating which options 
are “musts” and which others are choices, indicating how important certain supply-side 
options are for a sustainable energy transition, and exploring the “option values” of 
different technology clusters that might, for example, guide future investment decisions. 
In total, nine different restricted supply portfolios are explored for each of the 
six possible combinations of GEA-Efficiency, GEA-Mix, and GEA-Supply pathway 
groups and two transportation system transformations (Conventional and Advanced). 
Together with the unrestricted portfolios, this results in 60 unique pathways 
(3 levels of demand × 2 transportation systems × 10 supply portfolios), of which 
only 41 are able to feasibly meet the GEA’s stringent targets for sustainability. 
The various restricted portfolio pathways, as well as the rationales for including them 
in the portfolio analyses, are summarized in Table 4. The results of the analyses are 
shown in Figure 6. The 19 blank columns, each marked with an X, indicate those 
pathways that were not feasible given the portfolio restrictions. 
A headline conclusion of the portfolio analysis is that the low level of energy demand in the 
GEA-Efficiency group of pathways makes it possible to reach the sustainability objectives 
in the absence of both nuclear energy and CCS. For the intermediate and high levels of 
energy demand under the GEA-Mix and GEA-Supply pathways, respectively, excluding 
either nuclear or CCS is typically possible, but in the high-demand case this requires 
transforming the transportation system away from liquid fuels. Another important insight 
from the portfolio analysis is that the low energy demand in the GEA-Efficiency pathways 
also enables an energy transition with limited contributions from bioenergy, without BioCCS 
and without relying on carbon sink management. All of these land use-related supply 
options could have potentially adverse impacts on the global environment and, thus, remain 
controversial. Moreover, the speed and urgency of the supply-side transition is quite different 
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across the pathway groups. Namely, with the ambitious effort on the demand side in the 
GEA-Efficiency pathways, the change from current supply-side structures can be less rapid. 
In 2030, with the exception of wind and solar (which grow considerably in absolute terms), 
the primary energy supply mix in the GEA-Efficiency pathway is only modestly different from 
that of today. In contrast, the GEA-Mix and, in particular, the GEA-Supply pathways require 
more radical changes in energy supply over the next two decades. This includes a more rapid 
scaling up of all renewable supply options, and CCS, which by 2030 needs to remove up to 
10% of CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion in the GEA-Supply pathways, increasing 
to about 50% by 2050. The same is true for nuclear energy, which in the GEA-Efficiency 
pathway (with an unrestricted supply portfolio) continues to contribute about the same 
amount of energy as today or less through 2050, whereas in the GEA-Mix and GEA-Supply 
pathways a two- to five-fold increase up to 2050 is observed.
Furthermore, how the transportation sector is configured has profound implications 
for supply-side flexibility. Under the Advanced Transportation setup, the GEA-Supply 
group of pathways is still feasible if either BioCCS, carbon sink enhancement, 
Table 4 Overview of restricted supply portfolios in the GEA pathways.
Supply-side option
Main rationales for 
restriction
Restricted 
portfolio pathways Description
Carbon capture and 
storage (CCS)
  Storage availability
  Social acceptability
  Infrastructure requirements
  Environmental risks
No CCS1 CCS excluded
Bioenergy with CCS 
(BioCCS)
See entries for CCS and 
bioenergy
No BioCCS1 Bioenergy used only for co-firing in 
fossil CCS facilities (no dedicated BioCCS 
facilities)
Carbon sinks 
(afforestation)
  Resource availability
  Land use impacts
  Political acceptability
No sinks No additional afforestation beyond 
baseline assumption of no net global 
deforestation from 2070 onward
Bioenergy   Resource availability
  Land use impacts
  Food security risks
  Environmental risks
Limited bioenergy Bioenergy potential reduced to 50% 
of central estimate to reflect potential 
implementation issues for sustainable 
bioenergy (<130 EJ/yr throughout the 
21st century)
Nuclear energy   Environmental risks
  Social acceptability
  Proliferation risk
No nuclear1 No new nuclear power plants built after 
2020, leading to full phase-out after 
2060 (assuming 40-year plant lifetime)
Renewable energy Systems integration Limited renewables Intermittent renewables (wind, solar) 
restricted to supplying no more than 
20% of electricity consumption
Combinations2   Limited bioenergy + Limited renewables
  No nuclear + No CCS
  No BioCCS + No sinks + Limited bioenergy
1Option was fully excluded from the portfolio; for other options the restriction was implemented in terms of limited potentials.
2See individual options for rationales and descriptions.
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Figure 6
Composition of global primary energy 
supply in 2005 and 2050 for the three 
GEA pathway groups under alternative 
transportation sector assumptions 
and supply portfolios. Xs indicate 
infeasible pathways. Pathways marked 
with an asterisk (*) are bordering on 
infeasibility, with carbon prices slightly 
higher than defined in the note below. 
Energy savings are calculated by 
comparison with a hypothetical case 
with energy intensity improvements 
compatible with historical trends 
and no additional climate and 
energy policies.
*Feasibility is technically defined 
here as the inability of the supply 
side to deliver the (fixed) useful 
energy demand. As uncertainties 
grow over time, a modest undersupply 
of service demands of up to 5% beyond 
2050 is still interpreted as feasible. As in 
other studies (e.g., Clarke et al. (2009)), 
this concept is operationalized by 
declaring pathways with carbon prices 
higher than US$1000/tCO2 (discounted 
back to 2012 at a 5% real interest rate) 
as infeasible, because these pathways 
see significant penetration of so-called 
demand backstop penetration. 
This relaxation may lead to limited 
comparability of economic indicators 
(e.g., energy-related investments) 
across the restricted portfolio 
pathways after 2050.
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nuclear energy, full bioenergy supply, or the large-scale deployment of other 
renewable energy is excluded from the supply portfolio. In contrast, under the 
Conventional Transportation setup, only nuclear energy can be excluded to keep 
the GEA sustainability targets within reach. The situation is somewhat improved 
in the GEA-Mix group of pathways, where the Conventional Transportation setup 
still allows for the same choices as the Advanced Transportation setup under high 
energy demand (i.e., GEA-Supply). CCS turns out to be a crucial technology under 
these conditions, because in the absence of a major transition to electricity or 
hydrogen, or both, biofuels are the only alternative available to decarbonize the 
sector. As in the GEA-Supply groups of pathways, the limited sustainable bioenergy 
potential is a constraining factor, and CCS is important to remove the carbon from 
bioenergy feedstocks that does not end up in the liquid biofuel itself.
Commonalities and Choices across the GEA Pathways
Despite major differences in the levels of energy demand and in the nature 
of transportation system transformation, the GEA pathways share certain 
supply-side characteristics. All show a decarbonization of the supply mix away 
from conventional fossil fuels, especially coal. All show an ever-increasing 
share of energy services demand being met by renewable energy, particularly 
by the end of the century. And all show a substitution of traditional biomass 
with modern, cleaner forms of bioenergy. These commonalities are pervasive 
features of all the transition pathways for the global energy system toward the 
sustainability objectives. They can be interpreted as “musts,” that is, required 
elements of the supply-side transformation if the access, environmental, 
and security objectives are to be fulfilled.
In other areas, the three illustrative pathways have major points of difference. 
The most obvious, and the most influential, is the level of energy demand, which 
distinguishes the pathways by design. Emphasis on demand-side transformation 
varies massively between the GEA-Efficiency pathways and the GEA-Supply pathways 
at the extremes. Another point of difference, again by design, is the nature of 
transformation in the transportation sector, either Conventional, with an ongoing 
reliance on liquid fuels, or Advanced, a more radical departure from historical trends 
and existing infrastructures and technologies. These points of difference are analogous 
to broad, systemic choices about how and where to direct attention, investment, 
and policies in order to transform the energy system. None of the outcomes of these 
choices precludes a transition pathway that fulfills the GEA sustainability objectives: all 
are therefore feasible within these normative bounds. However, the interdependencies 
within the energy system mean that choices made in one part of the system have 
potentially major enabling or constraining effects elsewhere.
Despite the flexibility 
and choices available to 
direct the energy system 
transformation, a large 
number of commonalities 
across the pathways 
points to robust and 
nondiscretionary elements 
of the transition whose 
implementation would need 
to begin immediately. 
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The following sections highlight, more specifically, the commonalities and choices 
revealed by the GEA pathways analysis. The focus here is on six critical areas on the 
supply side: electricity generation, liquid and gaseous fuels, fossil resource extraction, 
low-carbon energy, carbon capture and storage, and bioenergy and land use. 
Electricity Generation
  Conventional coal power generation has to decrease very soon, and by 2030 
should not supply more electricity than today (Figure 7). This implies that new 
construction of coal power plants without CCS must stop, and that some existing 
plants will have to be retired prematurely or, if possible, retrofitted with CCS.
  Natural gas power generation, mostly in combined-cycle configurations but 
also as gas turbines for load balancing, sees considerable growth until around 
2030 and only thereafter faces a decline. Gas power can be considered a 
short- to medium-term bridge or transitional technology until longer-term 
options become more available at scale.
  Renewable power technologies show significant increases compared with the role 
they play in electricity generation today. This is clearly visible in Figure 7. Relatively 
mature technologies such as hydropower and onshore wind experience strong 
growth to 2030 and to 2050, with limited variability between pathway groups. 
Solar photovoltaic and solar thermal (i.e., concentrated solar power, CSP) are more 
variable and show stronger deployment after 2030, although by 2020 the average 
deployment shows a multifold increase compared with today’s levels. Biomass and 
geothermal electricity generation show much lower deployment levels on average 
compared with these other renewable technologies.
  Storage technologies, which could play an important role in the case of very 
high deployments of intermittent sources (wind, solar photovoltaic, and to a 
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Figure 7
Electricity supplied by different 
generation technologies in 2030 
and 2050 in the GEA pathways. 
The boxes represent interquartile 
(25th–75th percentile) ranges, 
and the horizontal lines within 
boxes represent medians across 
all feasible GEA pathways. Error 
bars indicate the full range across 
all feasible pathways.
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lesser extent CSP), particularly after 2020, will have to become available on a 
large scale. This can be supplemented with demand-side-management and/or 
so-called smart-grids. Like the renewables themselves, storage technologies are 
diverse, unevenly distributed (e.g., pumped storage hydropower), and in some 
cases less mature, more costly, and more dependent on new infrastructures 
(e.g., hydrogen electrolyzers and fuel cells) and business models.
  Fossil CCS provides a bridge or transitional option for the power sector. However, 
in contrast to conventional gas power generation, this is not common to all 
pathways, as the most efficient pathways do not necessarily include CCS. The most 
attractive option to combine with CCS in power generation is natural gas, with 
its cleaner fuel supply chains, lower upstream GHG emissions, higher conversion 
efficiencies, and significantly lower capital intensity. However, this is not entirely 
consistent with current R&D activities, which are focused on coal power generation 
with CCS. The focus on coal is, in turn, driven by the relative cost and abundance 
of the resource, as well as concerns over dependence on imported gas. Interest in 
gas with CCS is particularly weak in coal-rich regions such as China.
  Bioenergy with CCS plays an increasingly important role under more stringent 
climate stabilization targets; however, the deployment focus can be in either 
the electricity or the synthetic fuels sector, depending on the overall system 
configuration.
  Nuclear power represents the major choice, in terms of supply-side flexibility, 
that emerges from the GEA pathways analysis. Nuclear energy could certainly 
become one of the central sources of electricity generation by 2050, if effective 
technological, institutional, governance and legal frameworks are introduced 
to avoid present risks of nuclear energy, including in particular the risk of 
proliferation. It is thus important to emphasize that in all pathways nuclear power 
can also be fully phased out after 2060, with no new plants built after 2020. 
That said, the global “choice” of excluding nuclear power from the supply mix has 
implications for energy costs, as do any of the other restricted portfolio options.
Liquid and Gaseous Fuels
  Oil will continue to dominate the production of liquid and gaseous fuels 
(as energy carriers destined primarily for the transportation sector) in the 
short to medium term, contributing between 100 and 200 EJ in 2030. 
(See Figure 8, noting that oil refining is off the scale.)
  The biofuel contribution grows substantially in the medium term (Figure 8). 
This occurs both in regions that already have supportive policies in place 
(e.g., Brazil, the United States, and the European Union), but increasingly also 
in other regions with advantageous conditions for biofeedstock production 
(e.g., sub-Saharan Africa and Australia/New Zealand). By 2030 the range 
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is somewhere between today’s level and around 20 EJ, the latter of which 
corresponds to almost a 10-fold increase over 20 years. Even assuming greater 
penetration levels of electricity and hydrogen as transportation energy carriers 
in the medium and long term, as in the Advanced Transportation setup, biofuels 
continue to play an important transitional role over the next several decades. And 
in the very long term (beyond 2050), liquid biofuels may still have an important 
role in, for example, aviation and heavy freight transport. Once second-generation 
biofuel technologies become available at a larger scale, sometime between 2020 
and 2030, a pronounced diversification of biofuel production is foreseen.
  The potential substitution of oil products with synthetic fuels from natural gas 
(gas-to-liquid conversion) is effectively a choice rather than a common feature 
across all pathways. Coal-to-liquid conversion, on the other hand, plays a 
less important role at the global scale even with CCS, except in regions with 
abundant coal resources.
  In terms of gaseous fuel production, biomass gasification is limited even in 2050 
(depending on the choices made with respect to bioenergy production), although 
it can be readily integrated into existing natural gas infrastructures. The major 
choices with respect to gaseous fuels concern hydrogen; but again, these depend 
on the choices made with respect to Conventional versus Advanced Transportation 
systems and, within the latter, whether electricity or hydrogen is the preferred 
route (although hydrogen can also supply some industrial applications). If the 
build-up of a hydrogen-only infrastructure turns out to be too ambitious, the 
injection of hydrogen into the gas grid is a favorable (relatively low-cost) option 
that can help reduce direct CO2 emissions in the end-use sectors. If it is derived 
from fossil fuels, however, hydrogen is an attractive option only in combination 
with CCS. In the longer term its predominant source would be nuclear or 
renewable energy.
Figure 8
Deployment of liquid and 
gaseous fuel production 
technologies in 2030 and 
2050 in the GEA pathways. 
Boxes represent interquartile 
(25th–75th percentile) ranges, 
and horizontal lines within 
boxes represent medians of all 
feasible GEA pathways. Error 
bars indicate the full range 
across all feasible pathways.
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Fossil Resource Extraction
  The GEA pathways, in general, show peak oil and gas behavior over the course of the 
century; however, this is not because of the assumed physical scarcity of hydrocarbons, 
but rather due to the sustainability targets built into the GEA scenario, in particular the 
climate objectives, which inherently puts limitations on the use of fossil fuels.
  Coal extraction declines significantly over the next couple of decades across 
almost all transition pathways. However, after 2030, when CCS could become 
available at a larger scale, two distinct developments are possible, leading to a 
very wide range of possible levels of coal extraction by 2050. If CCS is excluded 
as a supply-side option, then coal extraction has to almost completely disappear 
by the middle of the century (only in the GEA-Mix and GEA-Efficiency pathway 
groups, where exclusion of CCS still allows the GEA sustainability targets to be 
feasibly met). On the other hand, if CCS can be successfully deployed at scale, 
a revival of coal extraction, reaching current levels and even going beyond, 
is an option. The absolute level depends on overall energy demand: in general, 
coal extraction is highest in the GEA-Supply group of pathways, followed by the 
GEA-Mix and the GEA-Efficiency groups.
  The extraction of conventional hydrocarbons lies within a smaller range than that of 
the unconventional categories (see Rogner (1997) for a definition of these categories), 
largely because the former still play an important role during the transition toward 
a sustainable energy system over the coming decades. Unconventional oil and gas 
resources tend to play a significant role only under specific conditions because of their 
relatively more energy- and emissions-intensive extraction processes.
Low-Carbon Energy
  Across all pathways, 60–90% of total global primary energy supply must 
come from low-carbon sources2 by 2050.
  By far the most complete decarbonization has to be achieved in electricity 
generation, and this has to be done relatively quickly. The global low-carbon 
threshold is in the range of 40–60% by 2020, starting from today’s share 
of around 35% (mostly from nuclear and hydropower). By 2050, almost full 
decarbonization of electricity generation (80–100%) is required. This implies the 
need for a continued expansion of renewable electricity generation and of nuclear 
power, or a rapid commercial deployment of CCS, or both. Financing for these 
mostly very capital intensive technologies and technology transfer mechanisms to 
enable deployment in developing countries remain major challenges.
2 In the GEA pathways analysis, low-carbon energy includes nuclear energy, renewables, and fossil with CCS 
at the primary energy level and in electricity generation, and at the final energy level fuels without direct CO2 
emissions (i.e., decarbonized electricity, district heat, and hydrogen) as well as solid biomass and biofuels.
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  In the transportation sector, the threshold level of low-carbon energy is 10% by 
2020, which represents a significant increase a starting point that is close to zero 
at present. By 2050, low-carbon energy shares in transport have to reach a range 
of 35–75%, depending on the demand level. 
  Renewable energy sources play an important role in essentially all GEA transition 
pathways. Even under the Limited Bioenergy and Limited Renewables pathways, 
renewable energy sources reach some 40% of total global primary energy supply 
by 2050. 
  The contribution of renewables varies considerably by region (Table 5). 
One reason for this is the resource supply curves (i.e., technical potential as 
well as resource quality) for the various renewable energy sources, which differ 
significantly across regions. Second, the availability of low-carbon supply-side 
alternatives (nuclear energy and fossil CCS), which ultimately determine the 
economic potential for renewable energy sources, is also strongly region 
dependent. Third, the tradability of renewable energies or of secondary energy 
carriers derived from them is very heterogeneous. Whereas liquid biofuels are 
easy to trade and can even rely on existing infrastructures, the scope for trading 
electricity (e.g., from wind, solar photovoltaic and CSP, and hydropower) at the 
global scale is much more limited, and for heat (e.g., solar thermal, geothermal), 
trade is not an option at all. This generally leads to higher exploitation rates of 
bioenergy potentials than of other renewables.
Table 5 Ranges of renewable energy deployments across the GEA Pathways, by region, 2050 (in Exajoules unless otherwise stated).
Region Bioenergy Hydropower Wind Solar1 Geothermal
All 
renewables
All 
renewables 
as % of total
Sub-Saharan Africa 8.8–40.5 2.0–5.5 0.0–19.6 0.5–25.5 0.0–0.3 11.4–91.4 31–94
Centrally Planned 
Asia and China
6.9–24.7 9.7–10.3 3.7–8.8 0.9–40.1 0.0–0.3 21.2–84.2 24–50
Eastern Europe 1.3–2.8 0.8–1.0 0.7–5.0 0.2–6.1 0.0–0.3 2.9–15.3 23–85
Former Soviet Union 2.9–10.1 2.7–15.8 1.4–7.4 0.3–9.7 0.0–1.0 7.4–43.9 25–93
Latin America 
and the Caribbean
10.5–22.5 10.7–17.6 3.6–12.4 0.5–21.8 0.0–1.8 25.3–76.1 40–100
Middle East and 
North Africa
1.2–5.1 0.8–1.2 1.3–8.7 0.5–15.8 0.0–0.3 3.8–31.1 17–40
North America 10.0–21.5 7.2–7.9 2.6–36.7 1.2–41.6 0.0–3.4 21–111 38–89
Pacific OECD 3.4–11.3 1.4–1.7 0.6–4.9 0.2–5.4 0.1–0.8 5.7–24 26–89
Pacific Asia 5.0–11.9 1.9–7.2 1.0–2.0 0.4–14.5 0.2–1.3 8.6–36.9 15–63
South Asia 5.2–20.8 3.5–4.3 1.1–6.7 1.0–79.0 0.0–0.2 10.7–111 21–65
Western Europe 3.9–11.0 5.7–7.6 3.0–30.2 0.7–28.9 0.1–2.1 13.4–79.8 34–83
World 78.3–139 49.9–80.1 28.5–134 7–285 0.6–11.9 164–651 28–74
NoTeS Ranges cover the full spread of the restricted supply portfolios. Values are calculated as primary energy supply using the substitution method.
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Carbon Capture and Storage
  In those pathways that do not exclude CCS as an option, considerable amounts of CO2 
would need to be stored between 2020 and 2030, quickly rising to much larger levels 
by 2050, at which point cumulative storage needs to be no less than 55 GtCO2 and 
probably closer to 250 GtCO2. The bulk of this would come from fossil CCS.
  Bioenergy in combination with CCS takes off only around 2040 but increases its 
contribution considerably in the latter half of the century.
  Under low demand pathways, as in the GEA-Efficiency group, CCS is a choice, not a “must.”
Bioenergy and Land
  The main commonality of the GEA pathways, with respect to bioenergy, is its increasing 
role in the global energy system, rising to almost 150 EJ by 2050 and 225 EJ by 2100 
(thus, well within the range of scenarios in the literature (Clarke et al., 2009)). 
  In the longer term, biomass can also play an essential role in achieving low GHG 
concentration targets by making negative emissions a possibility when bioenergy 
is combined with CCS.
  The impacts of this increased bioenergy production depend on several factors. 
First and foremost, first-generation bioenergy production routes may lead to 
extensive land use (either directly or indirectly) and are therefore likely to have 
negative impacts on biodiversity and food security. These impacts are expected 
to be considerably less for second-generation biofuels and electricity generation 
feedstocks (Dornburg and Faaij, 2005). The potential impacts of bioenergy on 
other policy and sustainability objectives imply that additional policies and strict 
monitoring of bioenergy and its land use implications will be necessary.
  A considerable part of the biomass consumed in the GEA pathways is 
supplied from residues, thus conforming to sustainability criteria.
  The GEA pathways imply an increase in land use for bioenergy 
production, though land availability does not appear to be a 
constraining factor in the GEA pathways. The exact amount of land 
used depends strongly on assumed yield increases and the types 
of bioenergy that are utilized. Still, bioenergy remains a relatively 
small category compared with other forms of land use (Figure 9). 
At the same time, the increase in land for bioenergy production 
in the GEA pathways is about equal to the total rise in agricultural 
land use, meaning that there is likely to be some further biodiversity 
loss and land scarcity. In the context of the GEA sustainability 
objectives, it will thus be particularly important that policies be 
put in place that can avoid a strongly adverse impact on crop prices 
(or the risk of such impacts in a situation of sharply rising energy prices).
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Figure 9
Land use in the illustrative 
GEA-Mix pathway.
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Financing the Energy System Transition
A core concern of the GEA transition pathways is to explore strategies to 
overcome the current, extremely inequitable distribution of incomes and the 
associated lack of access to clean and efficient energy services worldwide, 
while at the same time improving the environmental performance of energy end 
use and supply. When viewed through this lens, the world in 2050 will indeed 
look decidedly different from today. Current distinctions between low- and 
higher-income countries will be largely obsolete, as even the regions with the 
lowest per capita incomes today (sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia) will have 
advanced to lower-middle-income levels (annual per capita incomes in 2005 
dollars of US$5000–10,000), while other developing regions (Centrally Planned 
Asia and China, Latin America and the Caribbean) will have attained middle-class 
incomes and lifestyles (US$15,000–20,000) characteristic of many OECD countries 
in the 1990s. The GEA transition pathways thus describe a pattern of conditional 
convergence in incomes.
Given this increasing affluence worldwide, the biggest challenge revealed by the 
GEA pathways faces not energy consumers, who can confidently expect expanded 
and improved levels of energy services in the future, but rather entrepreneurs and 
policymakers. They need to embrace decidedly different views from those widely 
held today, focusing on energy services provision rather than mistakenly viewing 
technology- and policy-dependent levels of primary energy use as immutable, 
given consumer demand. Policymakers also need to embark on different policies, 
ones that combine both carrots and sticks, to include stricter building, appliance, 
and vehicle efficiency standards and changes in relative prices through taxes, 
subsidies, feed-in tariffs, and other measures. This would open up new business 
opportunities (e.g., for energy services companies), thereby creating new markets 
(e.g., for efficiency technologies) and leveraging the power of market forces to meet 
social concerns and public policy choices.
At the present time, total global energy supply-side investments are estimated 
at about US$960 billion.3 This corresponds to approximately 2% of global GDP, 
a relatively small share, but one that varies greatly among countries at different stages 
of economic development. At 3.5% of GDP on average, energy investments are a 
much larger part of the economy in the developing world than in the industrialized 
world, where they average just 1.3% of GDP.
3 This detailed, bottom-up cost calculation for the entire energy sector, which was conducted within the 
Global Energy Assessment, includes resource extraction (e.g., coal mining, oil wells) through development 
and production to delivery and transmission; it also accounts for historical capacity extensions (and 
replacement schedules).
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The magnitude of investments is considerably more uncertain on the demand-side, 
because of a lack of reliable statistics and difficulties in clearly defining what 
constitutes a purely energy-related investment. Present estimates are that around 
US$300 billion (with a range of about US$100 billion to US$700 billion) is invested 
annually in energy components at the end-use service level, such as engines in cars, 
boilers in building heating systems, and compressors, fans, and heating elements in 
large household appliances. Accounting in addition for the full cost of demand-side 
energy technologies (not only the energy components, i.e., the entire cost of a car) 
would increase investment – but also uncertainty – by about an order of magnitude, 
to about US$1700 billion (with a range of US$1000 billion to US$3500 billion).
Figure 10 summarizes present investment for individual supply-side sectors, 
as well as for energy components on the demand-side. Investments are most 
capital intensive in the power sector, which includes generation, transmission, 
and distribution. This sector thus accounts for about 42% of total investment, 
with generation (US$270 billion) accounting for about the same share as 
transmission or distribution (US$261 billion). The remaining supply-side investment 
is dominated by the fossil fuels upstream sector: US$130 billion for natural gas, 
US$210 billion for oil, and US$33 billion for coal. As mentioned above, the 
uncertainties are particularly large for demand-side investments, which account for 
at least 24% of total investment. The composition of energy sector investments 
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Renewable
Electricity
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Electricity
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Figure 10
Composition of 
energy investment in 2010. 
Total supply-side investment, 
excluding investment in fossil 
fuel exploration, is about 
US$960 billion. In addition, 
about >US$300 billion 
investments are made into 
energy components at 
the demand level.
  Transforming the energy system requires a massive scale-up 
of energy investments.
  A focus on energy efficiency allows achieving the multiple 
GEA objectives at lower costs.
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has been especially dynamic in the past few years. Renewable energy investment, 
in particular, grew at an unprecedented rate of more than 50% annually between 
2004 and 2008, and is presently about US$190 billion (of which US$160 billion was 
in power generation). By comparison, investment in fossil power generation in 2010 
was about US$110 billion.
The GEA transition pathways make clear that simultaneously achieving the 
multiple objectives for energy sustainability – along the dimensions of climate 
change, energy access, energy security, and air pollution and health – will require 
a scaling up of global energy investments by almost a factor of 2 compared 
with today, corresponding to annual investments of between US$1.7 trillion and 
US$2.2 trillion, or about 1.8–2.3% of global GDP. At these levels the effect of such 
investment patterns on the macroeconomy would be relatively small. Compared 
to a counterfactual (baseline) scenario without policy interventions to achieve the 
GEA sustainability targets, the projected loss to consumption by 2050 ranges from 
0.6% for the GEA-Efficiency pathways, to 1.4% for the GEA-Mix pathways, up to 
about 2.0% for the GEA-Supply pathways. This should be compared with 200% 
growth in overall consumption over the same period.
In addition to the need to scale up investment, all the GEA pathways depict significant 
changes in the structure of the investment portfolio. On the supply-side, for instance, 
the transformation of the system is achieved through pronounced shifts of investment 
away from the upstream fossil fuel sector to downstream electricity generation and 
transmission. Consequently, the share of upstream fossil fuel–related supply-side 
investment in total investment decreases from 30% at present to about 12–23% 
by 2050 (Figure 10). At the same time, electricity investment increases its share on 
average from about 42% to up to 68% by 2050. 
Among all supply-side options, the largest increase in investment needs is for 
renewable power generation, ranging from US$160 billion/year in 2050 in pathways 
with restricted renewables penetration to US$800 billion/year in pathways without 
CCS and nuclear power (compared with US$160 billion/year in 2010). Another priority 
for future investment is in building electricity transmission and distribution systems 
with sufficient operation and capacity reserves to increase reliability, as well as in 
power storage to allow the integration of intermittent renewables. Global average 
electricity grid investment (including storage) by 2050 thus increases to between 
US$310 billion and US$500 billion/year across the GEA pathways, compared with 
US$260 billion in 2010. 
Investment in CCS ranges from zero to about US$65 billion/year in 2050, 
and investment in nuclear is between US$5 billion and US$210 billion/year. 
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The higher-bound estimates correspond to pathways in each GEA pathway group 
that assume limited potential for other technologies, while the lower-bound 
estimates stem from pathways where nuclear power and CCS are excluded 
from the technology portfolio. 
Energy investments vary quite dramatically by region across the GEA pathways. 
Notably, with their rapidly growing economies and populations, the investment needs 
in the developing world will be much larger than in currently industrialized countries 
over the course of this century. Where exactly these capital flows originate is not 
yet certain, however. The GEA pathways – owing to the modeling approaches that 
were used to develop them – address the question of when and how to spatially 
allocate scarce investments to meet the sustainability objectives most cost-effectively, 
but they do not explicitly quantify who pays for those reductions. That will depend, 
to a large extent, on international agreements.
Policies to Mobilize Financial Resources
Although the GEA pathways reveal considerable uncertainty about future needs for 
investment in specific technology options, they clearly illustrate that present investment 
in energy is neither sufficient nor compatible in structure with a sustainable investment 
portfolio. Mobilizing the required financial resources for the transformation will thus 
be a major challenge, especially in the near term. An important characteristic of the 
energy sector is its long-lived capital stock, with lifetimes for infrastructure and energy 
conversion facilities of 30 to 60 years and sometimes longer. This longevity translates 
into high inertia in energy supply systems, impeding rapid transformation. Hence, the 
energy investment decisions of the next several years are of central importance, since 
they will have long-lasting implications and will critically shape the direction of the 
energy transition path for many years to come. 
Increasing investment in the energy system as depicted by the GEA pathways 
requires the careful consideration of a wide portfolio of policies in order to create 
the necessary financial incentives. This portfolio needs to include regulations and 
technology standards in sectors with relatively low price elasticity, in combination 
with externality pricing, to avoid rebound effects, as well as targeted subsidies to 
promote specific “no-regrets” options while addressing affordability. In addition, 
attention needs to be given to building an enabling technical, institutional, 
legal, and financial environment to complement traditional deployment policies 
(particularly in the developing world).
Table 6 identifies effective combinations of policies for specific technology 
options and puts these in the context of the required future investment needs. 
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Table 6 Energy investments needed to achieve GEA sustainability objectives and illustrative policy mechanisms for 
mobilizing financial resources.
Investment 
(billions of US$/year) Policy mechanisms
2010 2010–2050
Regulation, 
standards
Externality 
pricing
Carefully designed 
subsidies Capacity building
Efficiency n.a.a 290–800b Essential
(elimination of 
less efficient 
technologies every 
few years)
Essential 
(cannot achieve 
dramatic efficiency 
gains without prices 
that reflect full 
costs)
Complement
(ineffective without 
price regulation, multiple 
instruments possible)c
Essential
(expertise needed for 
new technologies)
Nuclear 5–40d 15–210 Essential
(waste disposal 
regulation and, of 
fuel cycle, to prevent 
proliferation)
Uncertain 
(GHG pricing helps 
nuclear but prices 
reflecting nuclear 
risks would hurt)
Uncertain 
(has been important in 
the past, but with GHG 
pricing perhaps not 
needed)
Desired
(need to correct the 
loss of expertise of 
recent decades)e
Renewables 190 260–1010 Complement
(renewable portfolio 
standards can 
complement GHG 
pricing)
Essential 
(GHG pricing 
is key to rapid 
development of 
renewables)
Complement 
(feed-in tariff and 
tax credits for R&D 
or production can 
complement GHG pricing)
Essential 
(expertise needed for 
new technologies)
CCS <1 0–64 Essential
(CCS requirement for 
all new coal plants 
and phase-in with 
existing)
Essential
(GHG pricing is 
essential, but even 
this is unlikely to 
suffice in near term)
Complement 
(would help with first 
plants while GHG price is 
still low)
Desired 
(expertise needed for 
new technologies)e
Infrastructuref 260 310–500 Essential
(security regulation 
critical for some 
aspects of reliability)
Uncertain 
(neutral effect)
Essential 
(customers must pay for 
reliability levels they value)
Essential
(expertise needed for 
new technologies)
Accessg n.a. 36–41 Essential 
(ensure 
standardization but 
must not hinder 
development)
Uncertain
(could reduce 
access by increasing 
costs of fossil fuel 
products)
Essential
(grants for grid, 
microfinancing for 
appliances, subsidies for 
cooking fuels)
Essential
(create enabling 
environment: technical, 
legal, institutional, 
financial)
a Global investments into efficiency improvements for the year 2010 are not available. Note, however, that the best-guess estimate from Chapter 24 of the 
Global Energy Assessment for investments into energy components of demand-side devices is by comparison about US$300 billion per year. This includes, 
for example, investments into the engines in cars, boilers in building heating systems, and compressors, fans, and heating elements in large household 
appliances. Uncertainty range is between US$100 billion and US$700 billion annually for investments in components. Accounting for the full investment costs 
of end-use devices would increase demand-side investments by about an order of magnitude.
b Estimate includes efficiency investments at the margin only and is thus an underestimate compared with demand-side investments into energy 
components given for 2010 (see note 1). 
c Efficiency improvements typically require a basket of financing tools in addition to subsidies, including, for example, low- or no-interest loans or, in general, 
access to capital and financing, guarantee funds, third-party financing, pay-as-you-save schemes, or feebates as well as information and educational 
instruments such as labeling, disclosure and certification mandates and programs, training and education, and information campaigns.
d Lower-bound estimate includes only traditional deployment investments in about 2 GW capacity additions in 2010. Upper-bound estimate includes, in 
addition, investments for plants under construction, fuel reprocessing, and estimated costs for capacity lifetime extensions.
e Note the large range of required investments for CCS and nuclear in 2010–2050. Depending on the social and political acceptability of these options, 
capacity building may become essential for achieving the high estimate of future investments.
f Overall electricity grid investments, including investments for operations and capacity reserves, back-up capacity, and power storage. 
g Annual costs for achieving almost universal access by 2030 (including electricity grid connections and fuel subsidies for clean cooking fuels).
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In addition, the costs and policies for different options are compared with those 
for promoting energy access (see the next section for further details). Different 
types of technologies and objectives will require different combinations of policy 
mechanisms to attract the necessary investment. Table 6 thus distinguishes 
among various mechanisms: “essential” policy mechanisms are those that must be 
included for a specific option to achieve the rapid energy system transformation; 
“desired” policy mechanisms are those that would help but are not a necessary 
condition; “uncertain” policy mechanisms are those where the outcome will 
depend on the policy emphasis and thus might favor or disfavor a specific option; 
and “complement” policies are those that are inadequate on their own but could 
complement other essential policies.
As the table illustrates, future investment needs are comparatively modest for 
some objectives, such as access; though to achieve all objectives simultaneously, 
a variety of different policy mechanisms, including subsidies, regulation, and 
capacity building need to be in place. Regulation and standards are also essential 
for almost all the other options; externality pricing (e.g., a carbon tax to promote 
the diffusion of renewables, CCS, or efficiency) might also be necessary for 
capital-intensive technologies to achieve rapid deployment. Capital requirements for 
energy infrastructure are among the highest of the options listed in Table 6. Thus, 
high priority needs to be given to future policies (including regulations) to address 
security and reliability aspects of the energy infrastructure. In addition, subsidies will 
need to ensure that customers can afford the reliability levels they value.
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How the Pathways Expand 
Energy Access for the Poor
The energy inequalities of the modern world run deep: the poorer three-quarters of 
the world’s population uses only 10 per cent of its energy; about 1.5 billion people still 
lack proper access to electricity, and around 3 billion are without access to modern 
fuels for cooking. Most rural and low-income urban households in developing nations 
still depend predominantly on biomass (including charcoal) to meet their cooking 
energy needs. Electricity, even when available, is rarely used for cooking. Therefore, 
access to modern fuels is as important as access to electricity, if not more important, 
for meeting the energy needs of most developing country households. 
All GEA transition pathways are consistent with meeting a target of almost universal 
energy access (to both clean cooking fuels and electricity for household energy needs) 
by 2030. Doing so requires that between US$36 billion and US$41 billion be spent 
annually over the next two decades. About half of the amount would be needed to 
improve access to electricity and the rest to improve access to clean cooking fuels. 
The largest share of this spending (more than a third of the total cost to achieve clean 
cooking fuel access and two-thirds of the electrification bill) will need to occur in 
sub-Saharan Africa. Costs of this magnitude are exceedingly small (less than 5% of 
global energy sector investment today); however, the benefits would be enormous. 
Energy access policies and measures will result in averting between 0.6 million and 
1.8 million premature deaths, on average, every year until 2030, or a savings of over 
24 million DALYs annually. Additional benefits include substantial time savings for 
women and children and the potential for improved livelihood opportunities.
  Achieving universal access to clean cooking fuels and electricity requires 
that between US$36 billion and US$41 billion be spent annually over 
the next two decades, the largest share in sub-Saharan Africa.
  Energy access policies and measures will help to avoid between 0.6 million 
and 1.8 million premature deaths, on average, every year until 2030.
  Microcredits and grants for modern cookstoves, fuel subsidies, 
high-voltage electricity grid extensions, and the proliferation of 
decentralized microgrids represent potentially successful mechanisms 
for achieving the energy access goals.
  The GHG emissions impacts of providing universal energy access are 
negligible.
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The detailed access modeling of the Global Energy Assessment is conducted 
using two separate frameworks: MESSAGE–ACCESS (Ekholm et al., 2010) and 
IMAGE (Bouwman et al., 2006). Three regions receive particular attention – 
sub-Saharan Africa (including Sudan), South Asia, and Pacific Asia – as these are 
the areas where lack of access is currently the most acute (Figure 11). These 
regions account for over 85% of the total global population without access to 
electricity and over 70% of the global population still dependent on solid fuels.
Various scenarios simulating different combinations of policy packages 
are modeled to determine their impact on access to cooking fuels in these 
regions, as well as the costs of such policies.4 The main policies considered to 
encourage a more rapid transition away from solid fuels for cooking include 
fuel subsidies – to reduce the cost of cleaner fuels – and grants or microlending 
– to make access to credit easier and lower households’ cost of borrowing. 
Both of these measures would make it cheaper and easier for households to 
purchase both the fuel and the end-use equipment (cook stoves). Purchase 
of the stoves needed to use cleaner fuels often involves a capital outlay beyond 
the reach of poor and rural households, which often have irregular cash inflows.
4 Although the specific choice of fuels and cooking technologies will certainly need to be context-specific, 
the GEA access scenarios use liquefied petroleum gases (LPG) as a proxy. This should not in any way be 
interpreted as an endorsement of LPG as the best of the available choices. Clearly, other alternative cooking 
fuels, such as biogas, natural gas, and other emerging sources such as ethanol gel and dimethyl ether, 
in combination with different stove technologies, might be better suited to certain regions or nations. 
In some cases, there might even be a transition to electricity for cooking.
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Figure 11 
Density of population lacking 
access to modern energy carriers 
in 2005 and costs and health 
benefits of achieving a universal 
cleaner cooking and electrification 
goal by 2030. Colored areas show 
people per km2 without access to 
electricity and those that use solid 
fuels for cooking, e.g., dark blue 
and red areas are where people 
do not have access to electricity 
and cook predominately by solid 
fuels. Cumulative investment 
requirements (in billion 2005 US$) 
between 2010 and 2030 are shown 
for three developing regions and for 
the globe as a whole. Also shown 
is the estimated population that 
would die prematurely if household 
air pollution remains unchanged 
in 2030.
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The impact of the alternative policy packages considered on the numbers of people 
dependent on solid fuels varies across the different regions from slight to dramatic 
(Figures 11 and 12). A subsidy policy that reduces the price of clean fuels by 20% 
below existing prices in each region would reduce the number dependent on 
solid fuels in all three regions from 2.4 billion (in the case with no new policies) 
to 1.9 billion. A policy that separately provides cheaper microfinance options for 
upfront costs and the purchase of end-use equipment would also reduce the number 
to 1.9 billion (assuming the interest charged on loans is 15%/year). Combining a fuel 
subsidy with microfinance, on the other hand, is found to be more effective in all 
regions in accelerating a shift away from solid fuels than either a subsidy-only policy 
or providing microfinance alone, as Figure 12 also shows. However, even the policy 
scenario that combines a subsidy of 50% on the existing price with microfinance still 
leaves about 500 million people reliant on solid fuels in 2030, virtually all of them in 
sub-Saharan Africa.
The costs of policies aimed at encouraging a more rapid transition to the use of clean 
cooking fuels depend on the combination of the policy instruments deployed and 
the extent of the subsidy, as shown in Table 7. Clearly, the choice of policies, the 
stringency of the targets, and the exact combination of clean fuels and end-use stove 
technologies promoted are likely to be specific to each country or region. However, 
the GEA access analysis presented here is indicative of the range of costs that would 
be expected. What is clear from this analysis is that although fuel subsidies are 
necessary to increase access for the poorest households and regions, subsidies alone 
are likely to be less effective in accelerating a transition to the use of clean fuels for 
cooking than a policy that combines subsidies with improved access to credit through 
microfinance institutions. Such a policy would make it easier for households to cover 
the capital costs associated with a switch to cleaner fuels. 
Figure 12
Impact of alternative policy scenarios 
on access to clean cooking fuels in three 
developing regions. Subsidies are relative to 
consumer price levels and are additional to 
existing subsidies.
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Fuel subsidies are often considered controversial in many nations, and a number 
of developing countries already have generous subsidies on kerosene and LPG. 
Although such subsidies may be justified on social grounds, they have often 
resulted in market distortions, been appropriated largely by richer consumers, 
and led to poor economic returns for energy suppliers and distributors. However, 
“smart” and targeted subsidy schemes and lifeline tariffs for poor customers can be 
designed and have proved successful, as in the case of the Bolsa Familia program 
in Brazil, which couples assistance to low-income families for the purchase of LPG 
fuel with mandatory child school attendance. Removing subsidies in a phased 
manner once incomes reach a level where households have the ability to pay can 
be challenging for governments but can be achieved if coupled with increased 
social spending in other areas. For the design and implementation of more 
targeted subsidy schemes and removal of nonmarket barriers, additional enabling 
conditions will need to be created in these nations. This will require additional 
capacity building to strengthen the administration of governance systems and 
local institutions.
Improving access to electricity offers some different challenges than for 
cooking fuels. What is essentially required is an acceleration of the current pace 
of electrification in the least developed countries and regions of the world. 
The problem is, decisions about where to expand electrification are typically 
Table 7 Cumulative financing required to provide access to clean cooking fuels and devices in developing Africa and Asia, 
2010–2030 (in billions of US$).
Policy intervention Region Fuel subsidy
New LPG 
stoves
Improved 
biomass 
cook stoves
Total, 
all three 
regions
20% fuel subsidy Sub–Saharan Africa 7.54 0.43 8.98 59.6–67.2
Pacific Asia 3.47 0.75 2.93
South Asia 27.56 6.41 9.11
50% fuel subsidy Sub-Saharan Africa 91.71 3.60 6.93 202.2–214.3
Pacific Asia 10.42 0.95 3.01
South Asia 81.49 7.55 8.60
Microfinance only1 Sub-Saharan Africa 0.00 2.19 9.66 21.6–31.2
Pacific Asia 0.00 0.87 3.05
South Asia 0.00 6.54 8.92
Microfinance + 20% fuel subsidy Sub-Saharan Africa 9.04 0.89 8.72 85.0–100.0
Pacific Asia 5.35 1.28 2.43
South Asia 50.87 12.88 8.56
Microfinance + 50% fuel subsidy Sub-Saharan Africa 130.67 6.52 5.20 315.2–339.4
Pacific Asia 16.72 1.71 2.60
South Asia 152.65 15.97 7.36
1 It is assumed that no public costs are associated with microlending and that microfinance institutions are able to recover their full 
costs from the interest charged. However, these can be considered costs if purchase of the stoves is financed from public grants
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grounded in standards or criteria for electrification, and in general such criteria 
support electrification in places where it is cheapest. Thus, utilities often select 
projects that require the least infrastructure investment relative to demand. 
Villages or communities that are closest to existing grids, that have the highest 
population density, or where economic activity is greatest are generally connected 
to the grid first. Expanding the grid to the poorest households or to most remote 
rural regions is typically not the logical choice from an economic perspective for 
electric utilities or developing country governments.
Figure 13 shows, for each region, the additional connection capacity and total 
cumulative investment needed until 2030 to achieve rural electrification in each 
developing region and compares results across the two modeling frameworks used. 
The largest investment needs, not surprisingly, are in sub-Saharan Africa, where 
cumulative investment to achieve universal access amounts to an additional US$230 
billion cumulatively between 2010 and 2030. In Pacific Asia and South Asia, the 
majority of investment is already expected to take place in the no new policies 
case (due to higher population densities and rising incomes), so that the additional 
investment needed is lower. In total, additional investment for universal access in the 
three regions is estimated at about US$300 billion cumulatively.
The energy demand and climate impacts of alternative policies for improving access to 
electricity and clean fuels for cooking are relatively modest. This is explained by either 
rapid adoption of improved biomass stoves (which double the efficiency of combustion) 
Figure 13
Additional connection capacity and cumulative investment required to 
achieve almost universal rural electrification in three developing regions. 
In general, the range in estimates depicted in the figure reflects the 
difference between the results from the two alternative models used. 
Two different levels of demand are assumed for household consumption 
within the models, corresponding to different electricity service 
levels: High demand (Universal access, 420 kW-h/household/year) and 
Low demand (Minimal access, 65 kW-h/household/year).
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or a shift away from biomass to more efficient LPG for cooking and from kerosene to 
electricity for lighting. In the most optimistic access scenario, for example, electricity 
demand in the three developing regions is projected to rise from 1.7 EJ in 2005 to 5.7 EJ 
by 2030 (displacing about 6.6 EJ of kerosene); total LPG demand increases from 1.1 EJ to 
9.4 EJ; and biomass demand declines from 13.4 EJ to 1.7 EJ. Note that such an increase 
in LPG would represent less than half of energy consumption in 2005 in the Western 
European transportation sector alone. For these reasons, the implications of universal 
access policies on GHG emissions are negligible, even declining marginally.
 An interactive Web-based scenario analysis tool gauging the effectiveness and impacts of various energy access policies and 
measures in the major developing regions of the world
URL: www.iiasa.ac.at/web-apps/ene/ENACT
The ENACT policy tool is based on the Global Energy Assessment energy access scenarios and methodology and allows policy 
makers and other users to select alternative rural electrification targets and other access policies (such as fuel subsidies and 
microfinance) to encourage a more rapid transition to clean, modern forms of energy in the households of the developing world. 
The interactive PC-based software presents in real-time quantitative estimates of the impacts of the chosen policies and targets in 
each region and how various combinations of measures compare to each other in terms of health impacts, energy demand, GHG 
emissions, and funding requirements. 
The policy tool focuses its analysis on three major world regions – sub-Saharan Africa, South and Pacific Asia, which face the most 
acute lack of access today. It allows for assessing policies and measures to enhance access to electricity and modern fuels and 
stoves for cooking in the residential sector.
box 3 The IIASA Energy Access Tool (Energy–ENACT)
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How the Pathways Preserve the 
Environment and Improve Human Health
Climate Change
The Global Energy Assessment adopts, as one of its main sustainability objectives, 
a target of limiting global average warming to 2°C above preindustrial levels. 
Such a limit reflects the current political focus, as enshrined in global agreements 
like the Copenhagen Accord, and is consistent with Article 2 of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change to “avoid dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system.” The 2°C target is one of the fundamental 
drivers of the demand- and supply-side transformations portrayed in the GEA 
pathways. This section focuses on the consequences of the transformation for the 
required reductions of GHG emissions, the pace at which the energy system will 
need to decarbonize, and associated costs.
The GEA pathways aim at achieving the ambitious 2°C target with maximum likelihood, 
while at the same time providing sufficient flexibility in the system to allow for 
multiple pathways to reach the target. Flexibility of solutions is central for identifying 
decarbonization strategies that are robust against multiple uncertainties due, for 
example, to potential technological failure and the associated risks. An extensive 
sensitivity analysis was therefore conducted to assess the maximum likelihoods under 
a range of assumptions for the stringency of emissions reductions. Exact numerical 
  To ensure a high likelihood of limiting global warming to 2°C, thus 
avoiding dangerous climate change, global CO2 emissions need to peak by 
about 2020 and then be reduced 30–70% by 2050 relative to 2000.
  Emissions must decline to almost zero or even negative levels in the long term.
  This requires a rapid introduction of climate change mitigation policies 
and measures over the next decade to stop emissions growth and a 
strengthening of those measures in the medium term.
  Measures include widespread diffusion of zero- and low-carbon energy 
supply technologies, with substantial reductions in energy intensity.
  Financial transfers from industrialized countries will be needed to support 
decarbonization efforts in the developing world.
  Present 2020 emissions reduction pledges under the Copenhagen Accord are 
inconsistent with the vast majority of the GEA pathways (i.e., the 2°C target).
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values for the likelihood of meeting the 2°C target differ slightly across the individual 
GEA-Efficiency, GEA-Mix, and GEA-Supply pathways; however, in principle all pathways 
stay below the 2°C target with a probability between 50% and 67%.5
Figure 14 compares the total global CO2 emissions6 trajectories of all the GEA 
pathways. As the figure illustrates, emissions may continue to increase for a very short 
period but eventually have to peak (by about 2020) and decline rapidly thereafter 
(reductions of about 30–70% by 2050 compared with 2000), reaching almost zero 
to negative emissions in the long term. The low-emissions pathways of the GEA are 
compatible with long-term atmospheric CO2 concentrations below 400 parts per 
million (ppm). In fact, by the end of the century, most of the GEA pathways bring 
CO2 concentrations back down to today’s concentration of about 390 ppm. Such 
low concentrations are the result of achieving globally negative emissions due to 
enhancements of the terrestrial sink potential (e.g., afforestation and reforestation) in 
combination with bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BioCCS) in the late 21st 
century. Taking into account the direct and indirect effects of non-CO2 GHG emissions 
and other radiatively active substances results in long-term concentration levels under 
the GEA scenarios of 440–450 ppm CO2-equivalent.
The stringency of the emissions reductions becomes apparent when reviewing the 
cumulative emissions budgets of the GEA pathways. Given the cumulative nature 
of climate change, aggregate emissions over the full century represent one of the 
5 The relationship among future GHG emissions, resulting changes in GHG concentrations in the atmosphere, 
and the ultimate effect in terms of temperature change is subject to large uncertainty. Major reasons for 
this uncertainty include the limited present understanding of important carbon cycle feedbacks and, in 
particular, the uncertainty surrounding the so-called climate sensitivity, defined as the increase in global 
mean temperature resulting from a doubling of the GHG concentration in the atmosphere. Because of 
these uncertainties, the climate impacts of the sustainable transition pathways are calculated within a 
probabilistic framework.
6 This section focuses on CO2 emissions, as these make up by far the largest share of greenhouse gas 
emissions from energy and industry. For non-CO2 emissions of the GEA pathways see the online GEA 
database: www.iiasa.ac.at/web-apps/ene/geadb.
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central boundary conditions for staying below the 2°C target. In the GEA pathways 
the allowable emissions budget is on average around 1180 GtCO2 between 
2010 and 2100 (full range: 940–1460 GtCO2). At today’s rate of emissions, this 
“headroom” would be spent on average in about 38 years (full range: 30–45 years). 
With continuing growth in emissions in the absence of any new climate policies, the 
budget would be used up within just 27 years, i.e., by 2037 (full range: 22–32 years).
The relatively wide range of emissions reductions by 2050 reflects uncertainties with 
respect to emissions reduction potentials in the long and the short term, derived 
from the comprehensive sensitivity analysis across the transformative GEA pathways. 
The uncertainties themselves represent both choices and unknowns in regards to 
policy implementation and technological development on the demand and the supply 
sides of the energy system (see Table 4). Generally, pathways that have restricted 
supply-side portfolios (e.g., limited potential for renewables, or no CCS) require 
more rapid emissions reductions early in the century, to compensate for the loss of 
mitigation potential in the long term. For example, in the absence of bioenergy and 
CCS, emissions from the energy sector cannot become negative in the long term and 
thus need to be reduced comparatively more early in the century. 
The bulk of the emissions reductions in the GEA pathways are achieved through 
decarbonization of supply, reducing the share of energy-related emissions from 50% 
Figure 15 
GHG emissions from energy supply and 
demand-side sectors in 2005 and in the three 
illustrative (unrestricted technology portfolio) GEA 
pathways in 2050. Dashed lines indicate additional 
GHG emissions from the non-energy sector. Error 
bars show the range across all GEA pathways 
within each pathway group.
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today to between about 25–45% by 2050 (with exception of pathways assuming limited 
intermittent renewables). For such dramatic transformations to be realized, however, 
integration of supply and demand remains an essential task, since one of the main 
reasons for the comparatively rapid decarbonization of supply is the increasing quality 
and flexibility of fuels consumed on the demand side (namely electricity). Higher fuel 
quality requires more elaborate conversion processes and thus permits decarbonization 
through both fuel switching (e.g., from coal power plants to renewable power) and 
end-of-pipe solutions (e.g., CCS). The latter option is economic only in large centralized 
systems and is not applicable in the context of dispersed and heterogeneous demand-side 
sources (except for some industrial applications, such as CCS from cement production). 
Efforts to reduce emissions differ significantly across regions and are generally higher 
in today’s industrialized world than in the developing world (Figure 15).
In the context of the Copenhagen Accord, various countries have already made 
commitments to mitigate their GHG emissions. The compound effect of these 
pledges is not yet clear, however, owing to numerous uncertainties.7 Rogelj et al. 
(2010), for example, estimate that the present pledges are likely to lead to global 
emissions of 47.9–53.6 GtCO2-eq. by 2020, while UNEP (2010) puts the range at 
48.8–51.2 GtCO2-eq. In any case, Figure 16 illustrates that even the most optimistic 
assumptions about future implementation of the pledges leads to emissions levels at 
around the upper bound of the GEA pathways. Present commitments are therefore 
not sufficient and thus they are inconsistent with the vast majority of the GEA 
pathways, which aim at limiting global temperature increase to 2°C compared with 
preindustrial times (with a likelihood of above 50%).
7 Estimates differ between studies that have collated individual country pledges and translated them into 
global emissions levels because of different assumptions about, for example, the business-as-usual scenario, 
national actions, the use of offsets included in other countries’ targets, particular emissions categories, and 
the role of land use change.
Figure 16
Short-term GHG emissions in the GEA pathways 
compared with the range of emissions resulting 
from present pledges by 2020. The lower error bar 
gives the 90th percentile range of 2020 emissions 
from low-mitigation scenarios in the literature 
(van Vuuren and Riahi, 2011). The GEA pathways are 
grouped according to ranges of CO2 prices by 2020.
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The gap between the present pledges and the GEA pathways ranges between none 
(a slight overlap of around 2 GtCO2-eq.) to as large as 11 GtCO2-eq. The pathways 
with no gap combine the most optimistic assumptions about the emissions reductions 
resulting from present pledges with the highest emissions estimate from all 41 feasible 
GEA pathways in 2020. However, as discussed earlier, the GEA pathways with the 
highest emissions in the short term coincide with those cases that employ the most 
optimistic assumptions about the future availability of technology, and in which the 
full portfolio of all mitigation options can expand pervasively and successfully. Any 
restriction to the portfolio of mitigation options requires greater emissions reductions 
over the short term, to compensate for the loss of emissions reduction potential in 
the long term. The gap between present pledges and the GEA pathways is therefore 
small only if one combines both the most optimistic assumptions about pledges 
with the most optimistic assumptions for the full portfolio of all mitigation options. 
The likelihood of the gap actually being small is thus rather low, especially if one 
considers the history of technology failure as well as the past performance of some 
countries in terms of emissions reductions.
Figure 16 also shows that, for the different groups of GEA pathways, carbon prices 
on the order of US$15–45 per tonne of CO2 would need to be introduced globally by 
2020, in order to bring emissions in that year back down to the level between 2005 
and 2010. Carbon pricing will need to be complemented by regulation and technology 
standards, however, to mobilize the required investments and to act against, for 
example, rebound effects or barriers to implementation. In addition, the stringency 
of the mitigation policies needs to increase over time, leading to CO2 prices increasing 
at about the pace of the discount rate (5%/year in the present analysis). In the most 
stringent emissions pathways, emissions need to drop to below the level of 2000 
by 2020. The global CO2 price corresponding to such stringent reductions is above 
US$110 per tonne of CO2.
Air Pollution and Health
Pollution control is an essential and fundamental component of sustainable 
development, as good air quality contributes to a healthy society and improves 
quality of life. Air pollution harms the environment, leads to acidification and 
eutrophication, and damages vegetation. Both ambient air quality in cities and 
air quality within rural and urban homes are major contributors to local health. In 
the developing world in particular, air pollution due to lack of access to modern 
cooking fuels has serious health consequences; hence, improving the quality of 
fuels through energy access policies remains a critical challenge. This section 
examines varying levels of stringency of air quality legislation in combination 
with a selection of other policies embedded in the GEA pathways, namely 
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those relating to energy access and climate change. The objective is to analyze 
in detail the implications of different policy packages in terms of their health 
benefits. Tools used include MESSAGE, which in this analysis is linked to the 
GAINS (Amann et al., 2008) and TM5 (Dentener et al., 2006) air quality models 
(see Riahi et al. (2011) for full methodology).8
Anthropogenic sources are major contributors to outdoor air pollution. The energy 
system alone contributes around 60% of all fine particulate matter (PM2.5) emissions 
(Rao et al., forthcoming). Outdoor air pollution was estimated to result in 2.75 million 
deaths or 23 million disability adjusted life years (DALYs) lost globally in 2005 
(Table 8), of which more than 70% of the burden was felt in Asia. This represents 
around 5% of all deaths, 2% of all DALYs and around 12% of the total burden 
that could be attributed to cardiovascular, respiratory and lung cancer in that year. 
Meanwhile, household air pollution in the developing world (primarily solid fuel 
combustion in traditional stoves) added another 2.2 million deaths and more than 
41.6 million DALYs, with the impacts felt mainly by women and children. Global air 
pollution control costs amounted to some US$195 billion in 2005, though most of this 
spending occurred in the industrialized world, as it has over the past several decades 
(Rao et al., forthcoming).
Future air pollution levels will depend on the continued development of the energy 
system and the types of policies that are implemented. For this reason, two different 
scenarios of future air quality are considered here. The first is a business-as-usual 
(BAU) scenario where all the air quality legislation that currently exists in individual 
countries throughout the world is enacted and, in addition, all currently planned 
8 The air pollution assessment described here builds upon the MESSAGE energy model as the primary tool 
for deriving detailed, sector-based estimates of various pollutant gases. In addition, MESSAGE is linked to 
the GAINS air quality model to represent different levels of air quality legislation until 2030. A number of air 
pollutants and GHGs have been downscaled to spatially explicit levels for 0.5-degree resolution. To estimate 
the impacts of the spatially explicit emissions, atmospheric concentrations of particulate matter, aerosols, and 
ozone were derived using the TM5 model.
  Through a combination of stringent air pollution, climate change, 
and energy access policies and measures, the GEA pathways 
drastically reduce the number of people exposed to harmful levels 
of air pollutant emissions.
  It is not possible to globally attain the World Health Organization 
guidelines for air quality without ensuring universal access to 
modern forms of energy.
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legislation actually comes to fruition.9 The scenario assumes no further progress 
in terms of either climate or energy access policies. In contrast, the sustainable 
GEA-Efficiency scenario ensures full achievement of all GEA objectives, including 
strong climate and universal energy access policies, as well as global implementation 
of extremely stringent pollution control policies until 2030. The latter pollution policy 
set – which includes stricter standards for power plants, factories, vehicles, shipping, 
9 The BAU scenario described here is equivalent to the CLE1 scenario in the air pollution section of 
Chapter 17 of the Global Energy Assessment, whereas the GEA-Efficiency scenario here is synonymous 
with scenario SLE2 in that same section.
Figure 17 
Geographic distribution 
of anthropogenic PM2.5 
concentrations in 2005 (top) 
and under alternative policy 
packages in 2030 (BAU, middle; 
GEA-Efficiency, bottom).
BAU
2030, ug/m3
<1
 1–10
 10–25
 25–35
 35–50
 50–100
>–100
2005, ug/m3
<1
 1–10
 10–25
 25–35
 35–50
 50–100
>–100
GEA-Efficiency
2030, ug/m3
<1
 1–10
 10–25
 25–35
 35–50
 50–100
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42
and in agriculture – is much more aggressive than the aggregate of all current and 
planned legislation but is still less aggressive than the so-called maximum feasible 
reduction level, which describes the technological frontier in terms of possible air 
quality control strategies by 2030 (see Amann et al. (2004), Cofala et al. (2007), 
Kupiainen and Klimont (2004) for specific policies and measures).
Compared to today, the enactment of all current and planned air quality legislation 
(as in the BAU scenario) is seen to curb the growth of pollutant emissions over the 
next two decades, especially in OECD countries (Figure 17). Emissions continue to 
increase in non-OECD countries, however, because of overall high energy demand 
and very little or nonexistent air quality legislation in many countries (e.g., in Africa). 
In other words, even if currently legislated air pollution control policies were 
implemented in all nations where they are now planned, only modest declines in 
pollutants would be expected, mainly because of increasing growth in emissions 
in developing countries in spite of the significant technological shifts that can be 
expected in those countries over the next two decades. The health impacts of 
outdoor air pollution increase almost 50% by 2030 in the BAU scenario (Table 8), 
whereas the impacts from household pollution decline by about 50%, thanks to 
a moderate improvement in the quality of cooking fuels. Due to higher activity 
levels and the increasing stringency of legislation, a threefold increase in annual 
air pollution control costs, to around US$600 billion, is required by 2030.
Table 8 Outdoor and household health impacts in 2005 and in 2030 for the BAU and GEA-Efficiency scenarios in 2030* 
(in millions of DALYs).
2005 2030
BAU GEA-Efficiency
Region Outdoor Household Outdoor Household Outdoor Household
World 23.1 41.6 33.6 >20 12.4 0
OECD 2.4 0 1.2 0 0.2 0
REFS** 1.9 0 0.9 0 0.2 0
Middle East and North Africa 0.6 0 1.4 0 0.2 0
South Asia 7.3 13.8 13 8 5.8 0
Pacific Asia 1.1 3.9 1.8 3.5 0.4 0
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.9 18.6 1.9 10 0.1 0
Centrally Planned Asia 8.6 4.6 13.2 <2.6 5.4 0
Latin America and the Caribbean 0.3 0.8 0.1 <0.4 0.1 0
*Some fractions of the population are exposed to both outdoor and household air pollution and given possible non-linearity of dose 
response functions at higher concentrations, impacts cannot be combined. 
**Reformed economies of Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union
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The GEA-Efficiency scenario, in contrast, illustrates just how far pollutant emissions, 
and their corresponding impacts on human health, can be reduced when stringent air 
quality policies are combined with strong policies on climate change, energy access, 
and energy efficiency (Table 8, Figure 17). The scenario results in an overall emissions 
reduction (across all pollutants) of at least 50% in 2030 compared with 2005 levels 
(Figure 18) and ensures that 100% of the world’s population breathes air that 
meets the WHO-mandated Tier I concentration level of 35 μg/m3 for PM2.5, which 
is the global target of the GEA pathways for the environmental and health objective 
(see Table 1). Such improved air quality throughout the world yields enormous health 
benefits by 2030: just 1.2 million deaths and only 12.4 million DALYs, reducing the 
pollution-related burden to less than 2% of total deaths, 1% of total DALYs and 
around 5% of deaths and DALYs that can be attributed to cardiovascular, respiratory 
and lung cancer. Importantly, as a result of policies driving universal access to clean 
cooking fuels by 2030, the GEA-Efficiency scenario sees the health impacts related to 
household air pollution disappear within just two decades.
Figure 18
Global energy-related PM2.5 emissions by sector in 2005 
and under alternative policy packages in 2030 (left figure). 
Global population exposed to fine particulate matter 
concentrations exceeding WHO air quality targets in 2005 and 
under alternative policy packages in 2030 (right figure). FLE 
refers to a scenario in which the stringency of pollution control 
legislation is forever frozen at today’s levels.
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How the Pathways Enhance Energy Security
Energy security has been a major concern for national and international energy 
systems for decades, and for this reason it remains an important sustainability 
objective to address in the GEA pathways. The challenge is that the concept of energy 
security has multiple dimensions. The following list summarizes some of the main 
energy security concerns today:
  Oil Volatility in the global oil market coupled with the geographic 
concentration of oil production; rapidly increasing demand under potentially 
constrained production capacities; growing dependence of an increasing 
number of countries on imported oil from ever fewer producing countries, 
with low-income countries often facing unaffordable costs of imports; 
and the dominance of oil in the transportation sector, where easily available 
substitutes are lacking
  Natural gas Dependence of a number of countries on imported natural gas, 
often procured from a single supplier and delivered through a limited number 
of potentially vulnerable routes and infrastructures
  Electricity Vulnerability of electricity systems associated with low diversity of 
power generation options, aging infrastructure, inadequate generation capacity, 
and rapid demand growth 
  Energy export revenue Volatility and uncertain sustainability of energy export 
revenue (“energy demand” security) in countries where energy resource 
extraction is a vital economic sector 
  Combined energy supply vulnerabilities Overall energy vulnerability of 
a number of individual countries that face several of the above concerns 
simultaneously.
The chapters focusing on energy security in the Global Energy Assessment 
establish a framework for analyzing the energy security-related vulnerabilities of 
energy systems associated with specific fuels, particular end-use sectors (including 
electricity as an energy carrier), and individual countries. In short, for each of these 
three subsystems, three dimensions of energy security concerns are identified: 
sovereignty (the degree of control that national governments have over energy 
systems), resilience (the ability of energy systems to respond to disruptions), 
and robustness (the risks related to the physical state of energy resources and 
infrastructure). The energy security analysis of the GEA pathways adopts a similar 
framework10 but considers different energy subsystems to reflect game-changing 
10 Specifically, the energy security analysis of the GEA pathways relates to sovereignty and resilience 
concerns. Robustness concerns could not be addressed at the aggregated level of world regions.
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developments in the transition pathways.11 Moreover, the analysis focuses not only 
on the globally traded fuels that dominate today (oil, gas, and coal) but also on the 
potential energy carriers of the future (electricity, biofuels and hydrogen). The main 
energy end-use sectors (transportation, industry, residential and commercial) and 
electricity generation are also analyzed in turn.
In all the GEA pathways, oil is phased out in the long term, accounting for between 
9% and 15% of global primary energy supply by 2050 and declining to less than 1% 
by the end of the century (compared to 36% today). As a result, trade volumes of oil 
for all pathways peak at about 100 EJ (compared with approximately 83 EJ today) 
between 2020 and 2030 and decline thereafter. Present energy security concerns 
associated with oil drastically diminish in the transition pathways because of 
comparatively modest demand growth due to efficiency improvements and a 
more diversified supply mix. Moreover, no “new oil” emerges in the global energy 
arena, and no other fuel comes to assume a dominant role similar to that which 
oil plays today. Biofuels, hydrogen, and electricity12 are traded in much smaller 
volumes and with greater geographic diversity of producers than is the case with 
oil at present. The only exception is natural gas, which by 2050 accounts for 
about 20% of primary energy globally and 36–51 EJ of trade per year across the 
range of GEA pathways. In terms of the geographic concentration of supply, gas 
production remains at its current level until about 2050, thus comparable to the 
11 Energy diversity is represented in the GEA pathways analysis by (1) a simple Shannon-Wiener diversity index, 
SWDI (Shannon and Weaver, 1963), and (2) a compound SWDI that simultaneously measures global energy 
trade (reflecting sovereignty concerns) and diversity (reflecting resilience concerns) (Jansen et al., 2004).
12 Although electricity comes to dominate final energy consumption, it is not, strictly speaking, a “fuel” 
as it is produced from a variety of sources. Moreover, global trade in electricity is minimal in all pathways, 
never accounting for more than 2% of total electricity supply.
  Under the GEA pathways, energy security improves in the 
world as a whole and in the majority of regions. The diversity of 
energy sources increases whereas both trade volumes and trade 
intensities (the share of traded energy in overall energy use) 
decline in most pathways.
  Individual end-use sectors generally use a more diverse mix of 
energy sources than today. The transportation sector, presently 
associated with major energy security concerns, achieves a diversity 
level similar to that in other end-use sectors.
  No individual fuel is likely to cause energy security concerns similar 
to those caused by oil today. 
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current concentration of oil production. And although gas production becomes 
even more concentrated later in the century, future energy security concerns for gas 
are not likely to be as severe as they are for oil, given that the overall diversity and 
resilience of national and regional energy systems will dramatically improve over 
time in the GEA pathways.
All regions of the world generally follow the global trend toward improved 
energy security in the GEA pathways (Table 9). Some experience a more rapid 
and pronounced increase in diversity and self-sufficiency of their energy systems, 
whereas others – particularly those with more limited energy options – could 
experience continued reliance on particular fuels (primarily natural gas) in specific 
sectors (transportation and electricity generation) under certain pathways. 
The flip side of the decrease in energy imports is a fall in energy exports for 
certain regions. Energy exports provide vital revenue for a number of countries, 
* Import dependency values are reported as negative if a region is a net energy exporter. World import dependency 
is the portion of global primary energy that is traded.
- The higher the diversity index, the greater the diversity and resilience of the energy resource portfolio. 
AFR = sub-Saharan Africa; CPA = China and Centrally Planned Asia; EEU = Eastern Europe; FSU = Former Soviet Union; 
LAM = Latin America and the Caribbean; MEA = Middle East and North Africa; NAM = North America; PAO = Pacific OECD; 
PAS = Pacific Asia; SAS = South Asia; WEU = Western Europe 
Table 9 Regional trends in diversity and import dependency, 2005 and 2050.
Diversity
Region
AFR
CPA
EEU
FSU
LAM
MEA
NAM
PAO
PAS
SAS
WEU
World
Import
Dependency*
2005
-8%
4%
36%
-54%
-34%
-187%
21%
41%
28%
20%
40%
20%
L
E
G
E
N
D
2050
-0.07
8%-14%
28%-34%
-0.56
-0.13
-0.46
2%-8%
-0.22
10%-28%
29%-32%
31%-36%
13%-16%
Electricity
2005
1.01
0.74
1.2
1.4
1.26
1
1.46
1.55
1.47
1.22
1.64
1.54
2050
1.24-1.73
1.06-1.77
1.38-1.76
1.36-1.70
1.41-1.73
1.09-1.23
1.28-1.76
1.46-1.79
1.28-1.72
0.92-1.55
1.48-1.75
1.38-1.77
Transport
2005
0.07
0.21
0.16
0.42
0.31
0.03
0.08
0.09
0.02
0.11
0.16
0.15
Primay Energy Supply
2005
1.40
1.17
1.53
1.37
1.44
0.95
1.54
1.48
1.50
1.46
1.61
1.62
2050
1.66-1.83
1.87-1.97
1.86-1.94
1.68-1.97
1.71-1.94
1.22-1.56
1.87-2.04
1.87-2.07
1.96-2.04
1.69-1.84
1.84-1.93
1.94-2.05
Compound
diversity index
2005
1.4
1.05
0.99
1.37
1.44
0.87
1.34
0.99
1.2
1.16
1.1
1.36
2050
1.51-1.73
1.56-1.73
1.32-1.50
1.68-1.97
1.71-1.94
1.17-1.49
1.71-1.91
1.70-1.81
1.45-1.74
1.03-1.25
1.27-1.34
1.64-1.77
Import Dependency*
low (<16%)
medium (16-34%)
high (>34%)
2050
1.64-1.89
1.72-1.85
1.43-1.60
1.34-1.51
1.38-1.68
1.12-1.47
1.55-1.80
1.64-1.95
1.53-1.88
1.68-1.82
1.52-1.73
1.79-1.92
Diversity
High (>1.5)
Medium (1.0-1.5)
Low (<1.0)
Compound diversity
High (>1.5)
Medium (1.0-1.5)
Low (<1.0)
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and rapid and profound declines in such revenue could adversely affect energy-
exporting regions. This drop in export volumes may be partly mitigated, however, 
by rising energy prices. The Middle East is poised to experience the largest decline in 
energy export volumes of all world regions because of the declining share of oil in the 
global energy mix. In contrast, the major export “winner” under all GEA pathways 
appears to be the countries of the former Soviet Union, which experience a dramatic 
rise in their energy exports due to the increasing demand for natural gas.
In terms of the evolving energy security landscape under the GEA pathways, 
certain commonalities exist between particular world regions. The first group 
includes such industrialized regions as the Pacific OECD countries, parts of 
Latin America and the Caribbean, North America, and Western Europe, 
which generally follow the global trends with respect to fuels and end-use 
sectors. Transitions in their energy systems are primarily driven by global factors: 
the switch away from fossil fuels, increases in efficiency, and diversification of 
transport technologies. Since all these transitions generally improve energy security by 
increasing resilience and sovereignty, energy security in these regions also improves 
significantly. The second group includes sub-Saharan Africa and Centrally Planned 
Asia, in which the global energy transitions provide a context for massive growth 
in regional energy systems. The expansion of energy systems in sub-Saharan Africa 
to extend energy access to all, and in Centrally Planned Asia and China to keep up 
with rapidly growing economies, results in dramatically altered configurations of 
energy systems, leapfrogging the inherited energy systems inertia of the currently 
industrialized world. As a result, many energy security indicators in these regions 
improve much more rapidly and dramatically than in the rest of the world, as their 
energy systems become more diverse and more reliant on regional rather than global 
resources. The third group includes those regions which because of their geography 
and either fossil fuel resource endowments (the Former Soviet Union, the Middle East 
and North Africa) or resource scarcity (Eastern Europe and South Asia), have more 
limited options for radical systemic change. The diversity of energy supply, especially in 
specific sectors in these regions, could remain below the global average. For example, 
their transportation and electricity sectors may become dominated by natural gas by 
the middle of the century.
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Conclusion: Harnessing Synergies 
between Multiple Energy Objectives
The energy system of the future could potentially develop in a number of different 
directions, depending on how society and its decision makers prioritize various 
worthwhile energy objectives, including, but not limited to, climate change 
mitigation, improved air quality and health, universal energy access, and enhanced 
energy security. The GEA transition pathways show that achieving these objectives 
simultaneously is technically possible, but it would require a dramatic transformation 
of the global energy system over the next several decades. And while transitions 
of this kind would generate enormous synergies, understanding these dynamic 
relationships requires a more integrated, holistic perspective than is typically taken 
by decision makers at the present time (McCollum et al., 2011). For this reason the 
synergies between the multiple energy objectives are often overlooked, or they are 
simply not understood. Compounding the problem is that in many countries separate 
policy institutions are responsible for dealing with each of the objectives. Moreover, 
the objectives often find themselves competing for attention in the policy world.
  Climate change mitigation can be an important entry point for 
achieving society’s pollution/health and energy security goals.
  Decarbonization of the energy system will lead to improved air quality 
and, thus, lower health impacts worldwide: globally aggregated DALYs 
can be reduced by up to 22 million in 2030.
  Decarbonization can help to further the energy security goals of 
individual countries and regions by promoting a more dependable, 
resilient, and diversified energy portfolio that sees an increased 
utilization of domestically available renewable energy sources.
  An integrated, holistic approach to energy policy and planning is 
badly needed: the combined costs of climate change mitigation, 
energy security, and air pollution control come at a significantly 
reduced total energy bill if the multiple benefits of each are properly 
accounted for in the calculation of total energy system costs.
  Added costs of pollution control are cut by up to US$500 billion 
annually in 2030 under stringent climate policy.
  Added costs of energy security are cut by up to US$130 billion 
annually in 2030 under stringent climate policy.
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This section views the major energy challenges facing society through an integrated, 
holistic lens. It attempts to illuminate the major synergies and, to a lesser extent, the 
trade-offs among the various energy objectives and the requisite policy choices and 
outcomes. In so doing, the analysis takes a slightly different approach from the GEA 
pathways described so far in the report. Here the illustrative GEA-Mix pathway is used 
as a starting point for generating several hundred alternate scenarios that attempt to 
cover a large portion of the full scenario space across several different dimensions.13 
(For instance, some scenarios push climate change mitigation while ignoring security 
and air pollution.) Within this space, many of the scenarios are unsustainable by GEA 
standards, as each meets (or fails to meet) the GEA targets for energy sustainability to 
varying degrees. The analysis uses these less stringent scenarios as counterfactuals and 
for comparison purposes, in order to show how certain objectives and policy choices 
push in the same direction, while in certain instances they could be in conflict.
Because the fulfillment of each of the individual GEA objectives can be measured in its 
own unique way, this section adopts a simple framework to describe the scenario space 
across all three objectives (Table 10). The framework defines three levels of satisfaction – 
Weak, Intermediate, and Stringent – for each of the three energy objectives, and specific 
numerical ranges are given for what constitutes each of these levels in terms of the 
relevant indicators. Note that the minimum allowable indicator values corresponding to 
the Stringent level derive directly from the official GEA targets for sustainability (Table 1).
The individual scenarios of the large ensemble vary greatly along the dimensions of 
climate change, pollution and health, and energy security, and for this reason the 
energy-related costs of the scenarios span a fairly wide range as well. This is illustrated 
in Figure 19, where each bar represents the cumulative costs of a single scenario, 
and the scenarios are sorted in order of increasing costs. If one thinks of the multiple 
energy objectives as societal targets that the energy system should attempt to satisfy 
(i.e., scenario inputs), then total costs are an embodiment (i.e., scenario outputs) of the 
system-wide transformations that must take place in order to meet those objectives 
13 Notably, the energy access objective is taken as given in this analysis. This simplification was made 
because energy access, compared with the other objectives, has the lowest impacts on energy use 
and GHG emissions.
Table 10 Indicators for climate change, pollution and health, and energy security and levels of 
satisfaction within the Weak–Intermediate–Stringent framework.
Fulfillment Climate Change
[probability of staying 
within 2ºC warming limit]
Pollution and Health
[million DALYs, 2030]
Energy security
[compound diversity 
indicator, 2030]
Weak <20% >33 <1.40
Intermediate 20–50% 15–33 1.40–1.50
Stringent >50% <15 >1.50
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(e.g., increased utilization of advanced technologies and alternative fuels). The 
resulting total cost of a given scenario thus depends entirely on how far it goes toward 
satisfying each individual objective, illustrated on the right side of the figure by the 
ranges of scenarios, from a cost perspective, that correspond to Weak, Intermediate, 
and Stringent fulfillment of the climate, pollution and health, and energy security 
objectives. The least costly scenarios – those making little or no improvement progress 
toward sustainability, such as the baseline – lie within the Weak region, whereas 
scenarios that achieve one or all of the objectives at the Intermediate or the Stringent 
level obviously incur costs in the middle or the upper end of the range, respectively. 
Notably, total costs range from 3.1% to 4.2% of globally-aggregated GDP (i.e., gross 
world product) for the class of scenarios that achieves stringent fulfillment of all three 
objectives simultaneously. By comparison, energy system costs in the counterfactual 
baseline are about 2.1% of GWP over the same time period. Hence, the combined 
costs of all climate, pollution, security, and access policies amount to just 1.0% to 
2.1% of GWP over this first part of the century.14
There are enormous co-benefits between pollution and climate policy. Thus, achieving 
society’s pollution and health objectives through climate change mitigation as an entry 
point has the potential to significantly reduce the added costs of pollution control. 
A closer look at three select scenarios of the large ensemble illustrates this point quite 
clearly. Each scenario in Figure 20 fulfills the pollution and health objective at the 
Stringent level; however, each does it by vastly different means, pursuing the climate 
objective to a greater or lesser degree. The Weak Climate scenario, for instance, 
14 An important caveat to the cost analysis shown here is that it performs only a partial economic accounting. 
The analysis attempts to capture multiple benefits in terms of avoided or reduced costs for climate change 
mitigation, energy security, and pollution control. However, given the inherent difficulties in valuing human 
life in the economic sense, and given the vast uncertainties with respect to the economic valuation of, for 
example, climate-related damages, the analysis does not attempt to value other benefits of pursuing these 
three objectives. Hence, the conclusions on multiple economic benefits presented in this section relate to 
“mitigation” costs only; they would become larger if other benefits were assigned an economic value as well.
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Figure 19
Cumulative discounted total energy system costs 
as a share of cumulative GDP for all scenarios in the 
full ensemble (2010–2050). Includes energy system 
investments (supply and demand technologies, 
as well as climate change mitigation, energy security, 
and pollution control investments), operation and 
maintenance, fuel, and nonenergy mitigation costs. 
Bars at right illustrate the ranges of total cost that 
correspond to Weak, Intermediate, and Stringent 
fulfillment of the climate, pollution and health, 
and energy security objectives. 
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represents a business-as-usual energy future, where climate change gains essentially 
no further traction throughout the world but in which decision makers recognize 
air pollution as a major problem requiring an immediate solution. As a result of the 
substantially more advanced end-of-pipe pollution controls that would be required 
in such a future, these pollution-only policies would add a significant US$830 billion 
to total annual energy system costs in 2030 (compared with US$1630 billion for the 
rest of the energy system). However, as the stringency of climate policy increases, 
the added costs of pollution control decrease significantly, especially in the Stringent 
Climate scenario, where control costs are US$470 billion less than in the Weak Climate 
scenario, a 57% reduction.15 This striking result illustrates that a significant portion 
of climate change mitigation costs can be compensated for by reduced pollution 
control requirements, a synergistic relationship that often gets overlooked by policy 
makers. The primary driver of these enormous synergies is investment in low-carbon 
energy technologies (e.g., nuclear and renewables), which have the co-benefit that 
they are also pollution-free. As the energy system is decarbonized, there is less air 
pollution generated and less of a need for end-of-pipe pollution control technologies 
at fossil power plants and factories and on vehicles.
It is also important to note that reducing air pollutant emissions can have potentially 
advantageous impacts on the global climate as well. The synergies between the 
two, however, are not likely to be as massive as those coming from the opposite 
direction (climate mitigation on pollution control). While reducing the quantity of 
key air pollutants emitted to the atmosphere – namely those that cause warming 
(black carbon and the ozone precursors methane, nitrogen oxides, carbon monoxide, 
and volatile organic compounds) – certainly could play a modest role in mitigating 
climate change (Cofala et al., 2009; Ramanathan and Xu, 2010), the climate feedbacks 
of air pollution are rather complex, and policy makers must be careful to ensure that 
control strategies reduce some specific pollutants proportionally more than others 
15 Generally, pollution control costs of scenarios reaching the Stringent fulfillment level are on the order of 
US$200 to US$350 billion in 2030.
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Global annual pollution control and climate 
change mitigation costs for Weak, Intermediate, 
and Stringent climate policy scenarios in 2030. 
The Stringent Climate scenario achieves the 2ºC 
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>60% and thus represents an upper-bound estimate 
for climate change mitigation costs and pollution 
control co-benefits across the GEA pathways.
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(e.g., warming components reduced more than the main cooling components, 
sulfur dioxide and organic carbon), in an effort to preserve the overall cooling effect 
of aerosols and, thus, to produce a net gain for the climate, or to at least remain 
radiant energy–neutral.
Stringent climate policies can also help to achieve near-term energy security goals. 
As countries and regions invest more heavily in renewables in an effort to decarbonize 
their economies, they will by extension reduce their need to import globally traded 
fossil energy commodities such as coal, oil, and natural gas. Because renewables 
 An interactive Web-based scenario analysis tool allowing the concurrent assessment of multiple energy objectives
URL: www.iiasa.ac.at/web-apps/ene/GeaMCA 
The ENE-MCA policy tool allows energy decision makers and planners to conduct a comprehensive and integrated assessment of 
the major energy challenges of the 21st century and, in so doing, to make more informed choices about the sustainable energy 
development pathways on which they will embark in the future. The ENE-MCA tool provides a comprehensive and interactive 
overview of the various synergies and trade-offs involved in attaching priorities to four of the main energy sustainability objectives – 
climate change, energy security, air pollution and health, and affordability. As not all objectives are given the same priority by 
different policymakers, ENE-MCA allows users to see how alternative worldviews can lead to qualitatively different energy system 
futures. It also permits users to visualize the complex, and not always obvious, relationships among the different policy choices 
they are considering making. The ENE-MCA policy tool was developed at IIASA in support of the Global Energy Assessment. 
box 4 The IIASA Energy—Multi Criteria Analysis Policy Tool (ENE-MCA)
53
The Next Energy Transition
(biomass, hydro, wind, solar, and geothermal) can potentially be produced almost 
entirely domestically (or at least regionally within a cluster of like-minded countries), 
they are from a dependency perspective inherently secure resources. At the same 
time, increased utilization of renewables tends to diversify the energy resource mix 
away from one that relies so heavily on fossil energy. Thus, decarbonization of the 
energy system can simultaneously reduce import dependence and increase energy 
diversity, both of which are key indicators of a more secure energy supply. 
Similar to the relationship between climate mitigation and pollution control, the 
costs of enhancing energy security are significantly reduced at higher levels of 
decarbonization. Figure 21 illustrates these co-benefits by summarizing energy 
security costs under three alternative climate policy regimes. When climate policies 
are weak or nonexistent, the security cost premium, in terms of globally-aggregated 
annual energy system investments, is estimated at approximately US$160 billion in 
2030. By comparison, under an Intermediate or a Stringent Climate regime, the added 
costs of security decline significantly, to just US$64 billion and US$28 billion/year, 
respectively (reductions of 61% and 84% compared with the Weak Climate case). 
The figure shows that security policy (applied at the level of individual countries and 
groups of countries) primarily spurs additional investments in end-use efficiency and 
electricity generation, while at the same time lowering the investment requirements 
for upstream energy extraction (coal mining and oil production). The security co-
benefits that stem from climate change mitigation are then largely attributed to the 
reduced need for extra “security investments,” since climate policy already promotes 
substantial investments in energy efficiency and conservation and the increased 
utilization of domestically produced, low-carbon energy sources.
Figure 21 
Global annual energy security investment 
and climate change mitigation costs for Weak, 
Intermediate, and Stringent climate policy 
scenarios in 2030. Note that the cost accounting 
for climate mitigation is more comprehensive 
than that shown for security, which captures 
only investments.
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